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Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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FROM THE UNO:

Iake Success and the Far East

On the Problem of Ascertaining the Aggressor

The Economic Situation in the East-European Countries
and the Soviet Union

OEEC in a Deadlock

EDITORIAL COMMENTS:

International Financing of Backward Countries and UNO

A Pact Between the Five Big Powers

Pleven's Plan on German Military Forces

Western Germany and the Schuman Plan

LETTER FROM ITALY:

Crisis in the Socialist Party of Italy

THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA:

How the Soviet Union is Being "Stabbed in the Back"

EDITORS: DUSHAN TIMOTIYEVICH AND ZDRAVKO PECHAR

Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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
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A CASE OF HUMANISM



"DON'T BE SCARED, KID, THIS IS NO ATOMIC BOMB — JUST AN OLD-FASHIONED, CLASSICAL WEAPON!"
("Jez" — Beograd)

Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

EDITORIAL COMMENT

LAKE SUCCESS AND THE FAR EAST

LAKE Success and the Far East — for several months these two have been the main forges of world events. While the earth rotates around its poles at a speed of 24 hours per turn, political events follow one another with varying tempo around these two poles which serve as points of orientation for finding one's way in international affairs.

At Lake Success and in the Far East, the United Nations were faced with a hard test. The tempo of events at certain moments was so accelerated that almost the whole world was caught up in the very unpleasant feeling that it was approaching disaster. The danger, however, did not consist only of the fact that the tension in relations was greater than it had ever been before in the post-war period, but also of the fact that the UNO found itself at a crossroads. There were two roads in front of it: to submit to force and to accomplished facts, meaning the road which had led to the degeneration of the League of Nations, or to follow the course already laid out at San Francisco, a course of collective defense of peace by all means and at any price.

The United Nations chose the course they would take in the spirit of San Francisco and the Charter and in that way preserved their place in the world and their future role in international events. This is, of course, a summary estimate of a whole series of recent actions by the UN and it does not take into

account various concrete measures and acts which deserve serious criticism and which decrease to a considerable degree the positive role of the United Nations during this year.

It should not be forgotten that the degeneration of the United Nations to the level of a passive observer, such as the League of Nations was, would mean the practical end of the United Nations. It would lead to the formation of two blocs between which there would be contact only at those points where interests conflicted and this would be a sure road to war.

It is not probable that the conflict in Korea will develop directly into a world war, although it was possible for this to happen. But it is clear that the crack-up of the United Nations under the burden of events in Korea would leave the doors wide open for a new world war.

In doing its fundamental duty in the most difficult moment of the post-war period, the United Nations is faced with the task of correcting to the greatest possible extent those faults which were plentiful in its actions connected with events in Korea. On the basis of this experience it should adopt decisions that would in the future guarantee the most effective and constructive action in every situation.

If we look at the present work of the General Assembly in this light, we shall see that there is, in essence, a conflict between two tendencies. One is the line of maximum activation of all member-states and consolidation of the material forces

which will support their decisions. The second is the tendency being championed by the USSR which consists in making collective action by the United Nations as difficult as possible, that is, replacing the United Nations by some sort of Trusteeship Committee over junior states. The trustees would according to that plan be the big powers (five of them) while all the other states would be relegated to the role of juveniles.

The United Nations rejected this attempt to transfer the Soviet method of solving political problems to the UN. Actually, this is nothing else than the introduction of a system of privileges and imposition of one will on others which has found such obvious expression in the attempts to wrest their hard-won independence from the peoples of Yugoslavia.

However, this attempt by the Soviet diplomats at the General Assembly deserves special attention in the light of the present situation and the experience of the recent past.

Pushing the people of Korea into the horrors of a sanguinary armed conflict on the basis of utterly erroneous appraisal of the reaction which this reckless adventure would provoke in the world, the Soviet Government suffered a serious political defeat and loss of prestige. The endeavor to achieve its expansionist program in one specific sector by a fait accompli and simultaneous boycott of the United Nations did not succeed. The Soviet repre-

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sentative had to return to the Security Council. Instead of a triumph over the United Nations, the Russian rulers met their Canossa.

The insincerity and hypocrisy toward the United Nations, using the Charter as a vehicle for demagogic speeches and the legal acrobatics of Vishinsky, are at the bottom of the Soviet proposal on the so-called pact of the five big powers which is not being presented for the first time. And here it is necessary to emphasise that this Soviet proposal on a big power pact is being repeated. This pact has already been on the agenda of the General Assembly, and has again been pulled out of the files. It contains the fundamental conceptions of international cooperation of the Moscow rulers.

From Teheran, through Yalta to Potsdam, the Russians thought of mutual bargaining among the big powers as the essence of international relations, to avoid misuse of the word cooperation here. While such a method of solving current problems was understandable in the war period and was, as a necessary evil, both necessary and advantageous despite all the harmful after-effects in certain concrete cases, it is absolutely unacceptable and dangerous as a permanent method of solving international problems.

The UNO was founded precisely in order to graduate from the narrow framework of war conferences to broad international cooperation after the end of the war. What is more, practice has shown that some of the problems that were left to the big powers for solution had to be put to the United Nations anyway, like the question of Korea, for instance, and the problem of the former Italian colonies, etc.

The fact that the Soviet Delegation at this session came out with its proposal on the big power pact, after it had tried to break up the United Nations by boycott of UN and the provocation and abetting of the conflict in Korea, shows that the USSR is not abandoning its hegemonistic policy. But it is, at the same time, forced to recognize the authority of the United Nations.

It is to be hoped that the General Assembly will remain consistent until the end of its work on certain points to the policy of consolidating the UNO, and that it will thus be made capable of playing its historic role.

On the other hand, the UNO is faced with even more difficult tasks in Korea and in the Far East in general. Various indications and the most recent reports show that the problem of the Far East will demand a great deal of statesmanlike wisdom and understanding of the aspirations of the peoples of Asia. Undoubtedly, the UN will have the opportunity to put the results of this year's session to a practical test there. What the UN does in the Far East will have to confirm the theory and principles which are forged at Lake Success. Only complete accord between theory and practice will assure UN activities full success which will consist not only in saving the authority of the Organization in one concrete case, but in permanent consolidation of world peace.

OBSERVER

P'even's Plan on German Military Forces

ONCE agreement had been reached in principle between the three Western powers and in the Atlantic Pact Council regarding the setting up of "an international army for the defence of Europe", and on the participation and contribution of Western Germany to the military efforts of the Western powers, the question of the ways and the scope of West German participation was next to be placed on the agenda. Widely varying ideas have been advanced by Western public opinion — ranging from outright opposition to any sort of rearming of Western Germany to her being placed on an equal military footing with the other partners in the Western sphere.

All these conflicting concepts have been particularly pronounced in France herself, as an outcome of that country's specific position and her evil experience with Germany.

Her attitude, contained in the declaration read in the Chamber of Deputies by Premier Plevin, reflects two fundamental contradictions the French leaders have been confronting on the issue: the desire, on the one hand, to utilize Germany's economic and military potential for the organizing of the "defence forces" of the West and the endeavours, on the other, to secure for France that role in Europe which by virtue of her industrial and military potential might be assumed by Germany, in the event of the latter being allowed to participate as a more or less equal partner in the military efforts of the Atlantic Pact member-states.

The idea contained in the Schuman Plan — that Europe should first be unified and organized, co-ordinating its efforts in the economic field by adopting the Schuman Plan for the merging of the coal and steel industries as a prerequisite to Western Germany's participation in the "joint military efforts" of the Western powers — reflects the endeavours of the French Government to secure for France such political and economic positions in Europe which would safeguard her from any surprises on the part of the future German partner.

The proposal on the incorporation of minor German units, numbering between 800 and 1,200 men, in large tactical units under non-German command, represents a safeguard against the possibility of Germany's becoming militarily independent, and is designed to allay the fears of the French national masses from an eventual revival of German militarism.

These questions form the subject of discussions between the Western powers today. It is necessary to add that the attitude adopted by U. S. A., and shared by Great Britain, differs from the view put forward by France especially as regards the French proposal concerning the formation of "atomized" German units within the army of Europe. The U. S. considers that sanction should be given for the formation of German divisions un-

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der German command which would be incorporated in the so-called Army of Europe. This U. S. attitude is explained by the fact that, in this instance, the U. S. is probably less anxious about the individual interests of the countries involved than about the realization of West European and the so-called Atlantic region's consolidation in a military sense.

The Prague conference of foreign ministers of the East European countries, as well as the resolution which was passed on that occasion, aimed at trying to hinder the plans of the Western powers by appealing to the German people in the first place. On top of that, it was necessary to shed responsibility for the adoption of further, primarily military steps and the other forms of affirmation of the East German State. The appeals launched from the Prague conference for the creation of a united Germany, and against remilitarization and the revival of Western Germany's armaments industry, etc., sound insincere when set against the notorious fact that, under the guise of an East German police force, German military units are in effect being created, that on the Oder river in East Germany huge steel mills are being erected with an eye on military requirements primarily, and that other measures are likewise being undertaken with a view to the definitive isolation of Eastern Germany and the bloc of East-European countries dominated by the USSR.

There is not the slightest doubt that the policy of USSR has been largely responsible for the development leading to the proposals and measures for the re-arming of Germany, a development in no way related to the need for the establishment of a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany in Europe, which had also been the aim of peace loving nations in the Second World War.

A Pact Between the Five Big Powers?

A PACT among the big Powers — that is the governing idea in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. To keep the small ones aside during the adoption of decisions and to strike bargains with the big ones at the expense of the small ones. The example of Yugoslavia is sufficiently eloquent illustration of this Soviet tendency. But this is not only a matter of Yugoslavia. Soviet schemes with regard to Greece, Bulgaria, Spain etc., are well known. Did not the Soviet representative in 1945, when the fate of the former Italian colonies was being decided by the USA, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, propose the division of Libya into Cyrenaica and Tripoli with Cyrenaica going to Great Britain and Tripoli to the Soviet Union. And did not Mr. Vishinsky in 1948 propose — again to the big powers — that all the former Italian colonies be divided up among the USA, Great Britain, France and the USSR.

The small countries represented in the UNO, and with them all the peoples of the world, have opposed this policy on more than one occasion. It was necessary to suffocate the voice of these small ones. Especially since at that moment Yugoslavia pointed out that great words and phrases on democracy can conceal selfish, hegemonistic interests.

At last year's UN General Assembly Session, the chief of the Soviet Delegation, Vishinsky, on September 23, 1949, proposed in the general debate that the big powers conclude "a pact for the consolidation of peace". The pact was not concluded but the Greek liberation movement was sacrificed as the price which was to show the good intentions of the USSR toward the other big powers.

The situation in the world is such that it is clear to the politicians of the western countries that a big five power pact would be unpopular because the masses would see in it an obstacle to the work of the UNO

which they consider as the most suitable institution for the solution of all international problems. But the USSR did not allow itself to be kept back in its endeavours.

In submitting "a declaration on the elimination of the danger of a new war and on the consolidation of peace and the security of peoples" to this year's UN General Assembly session, the Soviet representative, A. Vishinsky, again moved the question of a pact among the five big powers. The UNO forums are too broad for the USSR. The small countries sit in them, and their interests often conflict with the interests of the big powers so that it is better if the big countries make agreements among themselves behind closed doors. At a moment when the USSR is pursuing a policy of division of the world into spheres of influence, when it is by-passing the interests of the small countries in order to satisfy its hegemonistic motives, the five big powers' pact would undoubtedly represent an institution for the subjugation of the small countries. Cooperation among the big powers is an important factor in international relations which can make the greatest contribution to the cause of peace. If the big powers, primarily the USSR, sincerely want peace, they can best build it through the UNO, through the Security Council, meaning through forums which have been provided for that purpose and which are most suitable for it. The political situation in the world demands that the General Assembly, that broadest of all international forums, make the most responsible decisions. Narrowing the competence of the UNO today is not only unpopular, it is harmful. And a big five power pact as proposed by the Soviet representative would have this narrowing effect and would mean the danger of its being transformed into an instrument of the big powers at the expense of the small ones.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

International Financing of
Backward Countries
and UNO

IN the discussion which has been going on a month already in the Economic Committee of the General Assembly on economic assistance to insufficiently developed countries, two fundamental tendencies have found expression. Those countries from which the help would have to be forthcoming see the solution primarily in private investments and propose that backward countries undertake suitable measures for attracting foreign capital. They anticipate international action mainly in relation to the question of technical assistance to backward countries. Insofar as economic assistance comes from the governments of the various states, these states take the point of view that this help should be given on the basis of liberal agreements, and not through international organizations. On the other hand, the other countries, primarily those who need help, take the point of view that effective help can be given only through international organizations by way of public international financing, in order to avoid the danger of interference by the investors in the internal affairs of the countries receiving the help. They think that help should not be based on the principle of direct profits for the various investments but on the basis of the welfare of the entire national economy of the country in question, on the basis of the benefit which they might have for the general economic development of the country and its increasing prosperity. The representatives of the interested countries rightfully emphasize that private financing is now in a crisis and even if that were not the case, it could not carry out the task facing it for private investors are interested first and foremost in direct profits on their investments and very little or not at all in the development of the economy of the respective country as a whole.

It is significant that the majority of the delegates to the Economic

Committee came out in favor of the latter thesis. The representative of Pakistan, for instance, proposed the establishment of a UN bank which would lend funds to insufficiently developed countries, which funds would be needed for the financing of projects in the sphere of transportation, power, telecommunications, health, education, etc. On its part, the Yugoslav delegation proposed the foundation of an international organization similar to UNRRA, which would collect and distribute financial means to the economically backward countries with the purpose of promoting their economic development. This proposal takes into consideration the points of view brought out during the discussion and is based on the experience from international practice that a rapid and successful development of insufficiently developed countries is possible only if they receive help from outside which is not linked with any kinds of conditions which would not be in accordance with national independence.

A decision on this problem is to be made soon. It is certain that the UN, in adopting decisions in the sense of these proposals, would be taking a big step forward in the direction of eliminating a whole series of neuralgic point in the world, which today represent a source of instability and danger of new conflicts. Perhaps it is precisely in this that we can find the reason for the stand which the Soviet Delegation has taken on this problem. The Soviet Delegate, Arutiunian, who is abetted by the rest of the Eastern European delegates, has concentrated his activities on tales about the "unselfish" aid of the Soviet Union to China and Mongolia, on obstructing and delaying the discussion, without submitting any constructive proposals and avoiding making any statement as to whether the USSR would join any such action by UNO.

The correct solution of this question, however, regardless of the stand of the USSR, will be a new proof of the success of international cooperation through the UNO and an important contribution to world peace.

An Increase from 32 to
over 50 Per Cent.

THE official Polish News Agency published the statistical data on the foreign trade of Poland for the year 1949. From these data, it can be seen that Poland has effected an exchange of goods to the total amount of 4,952 million roubles, or 1,238 million dollars at the new exchange rate of roubles into dollars. In this trade exchange, the USSR has participated to the extent of 400 million dollars, or 32 per cent, while the other Eastern European countries participated with 160 million dollars, or 13 per cent. The same agency also published some summary data about the development of the Polish foreign trade during the first nine months of this year. It appears, from these data, that the exchange of goods with the USSR during this year has increased by 71 per cent. If we assume that this increase in trade might be maintained till the end of this year (the same may be even greater, but hardly smaller) then one may conclude that the Soviet Union this year will participate in the foreign trade of Poland by more than 50 per cent. This high percentage of trade with the Soviet Union clearly shows the monopolistic position it holds in the foreign trade of Poland. This great increase and one-sided tendency of the Polish foreign trade is not only due to the fact that the USSR buys steadily ever larger quantities of Polish products for its own use, but it is also due to the fact that the Soviet Union buys these products for re-export to other countries. This re-export transaction of the Soviet Union with Polish goods can be observed best when one looks at the Polish list of exports to Soviet Russia, in which very important items consist of chemicals and rolled metals. And those two export items are the chief items which figure in practically all the trade agreements, which the Soviet Union concludes with the Eastern European and other countries, which are under its domination.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Western Germany and the Schuman Plan

A RECENT declaration has caused the question of the realization of the Schuman Plan for joint control of the West European coal and steel industry to emerge from the obscurity in which it had been languishing for some time, and to become once more the subject of lively comment by the world public opinion. The architect of that declaration was Dr. Lehr, one of Ruhr's steel magnates, of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke. Shunning all ambiguity, Dr. Lehr stated that the interests of the German coal and steel industry lay not in the realization of the Schuman Plan, but in the establishment of an organization similar to the pre-war International Steel Cartel, which would regulate the European market relationships. Although the West German Government came out with a declaration to the effect that their attitude toward the Schuman Plan had undergone no change, the entire problem assumed a characteristic aspect within Dr. Lehr's subsequent inclusion in the West German Government as Minister of Home Affairs.

The creation of a unified coal and steel market for the participating countries has been the principal obstacle for the implementation of the Schuman Plan. A unified market implies unified prices. But how are the high production costs of the Belgian coal industry and of the Italian steel industry to be adapted to the German costs of production, which are 50 per cent lower? The French proposal envisages the establishment of a compensations fund for indemnifying the countries having high production costs for losses sustained in selling at the lower unified rates fixed by the supreme authority. The fund would operate by means of levies on the producers enjoying more favourable conditions, i. e. on the countries having low production costs, the practical effect of

which would be for Western Germany to become the one exclusively burdened with this levy.

The international market position at the time of the publication of the Schuman Plan differed considerably from the present one. The supply exceeded the demand, and the prices were very low. Excess production of steel was becoming a reality to be reckoned with. At that period, it would have been to the benefit of Western Germany to join an international agreement guaranteeing her a permanent market, on the one hand, and enabling her to attain political objectives by cooperating in the "organizing" of capitalist Europe, on the other. Due to the newly-created world political situation and the war trade boom, the German interests have undergone a thorough change. Hence the procrastinations and the blocking of agreement between the Schuman Plan member-states.

In proposing the Plan, France primarily pursued the materialization of a European agreement which would include Germany, too. France had been reckoning with a debilitated Germany, such as she emerged from the Second World War. Today though, with an increase in Germany's war potential being only a question of days — which basically alters the substance of Franco-German relations — the finalization of negotiations on the joint administration of the coal and steel industries appears in a new light. Whilst there is a tendency from the German side, as exemplified by Dr. Lehr's declaration, to defer the conclusion of the agreement, the French are anxious to conclude it as soon as possible. It is even suggested in French official statements that the definitive conclusion of the agreement is pending within a few weeks.

Vyshinsky's Latest Contradiction

STARTING from the premise that the USSR is a fearless champion of peace, which believes that communism and capitalism can exist alongside, Mr. Vyshinsky in the General Assembly's Political Committee advanced the thesis that the USSR wishes to trade with the West. In order to prove this he quoted all the statements, articles and opinions of the Soviet leaders on this proposition. Finally, he asserted that the Soviet Union, although it no longer needed goods from the capitalist lands, nevertheless upheld the principle of the possibility of trade among countries belonging to different systems.

Between these two parts of Mr. Vyshinsky's conclusion there obviously exists a contradiction, but this very contradiction shows that Mr. Vyshinsky is consistent — consistent to the principle of the Soviet leaders to speak in one way and act in another. In words he advocates the principle of the possibility of trade among countries with different systems. In practice, however, the Soviet Union endeavours to narrow down and prevent as much as possible all trade between the West and those countries which are subjugated to the USSR.

But regardless of this, Mr. Vyshinsky is right in one respect. Namely, he is right in asserting that the USSR does not indispensably need goods from the capitalist countries for the simple reason that the USSR covers its requirements from the lands which are subjugated to it and whose foreign trade it has placed under its direct control. This fact throws light on M. Vyshinsky's thesis, which is out to prove that the latter countries need no goods from the capitalist states. This thesis should have to justify the practice of the Soviet policy in its relations with those lands.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

A Harmful Decision

GENERAL Franco was undoubtedly very happy on November 1st. That day in the United Nations, for which he feels only hatred and scorn, a resolution by eight states was voted revoking the decision of the General Assembly of December 12, 1946, which had recommended to the United Nations that they recall their Ambassadors and Envoys from Madrid and prohibit membership in the specialized institutions of the UNO to Franco Spain. The news about this recent decision had a sad echo for all freedom-loving people in the world.

There is something strange in the arguments of the supporters of this resolution when they say that Franco's Spain "helped the UN in the war against the Axis states", there is something miserable there that must make every democrat wince with shame. The delegates to the Special Political Committee could not hide their uneasiness at being witnesses to or even participants in such open compacts being made with the enemy of everything which the UN should serve. For the decision adopted by the Committee can be qualified in no other way than as an at-

tempt to consolidate fascism in Spain and to bring Franco's regime into the UNO through the back door.

After the war, it was hard to turn a deaf ear to the demands of the masses that an end be put to Franco's regime in Spain. By the 1946 Resolution, which was actually only an unskillful and lukewarm attempt to isolate Franco, it was at least partially succeeded in consoling the democratic public. But this concession, made before the overpowering force of anti-fascist feeling, was only a temporary one. The undermining activities aimed at abrogating the adopted resolution and opening the UN doors to Franco's representatives did not cease until they finally bore fruit. The responsibility for this is borne not only by those who are open advocates of Franco's regime but also by his "opponents". The latter's mild and make-believe resistance has indirectly incited reactionary forces to sabotage and destroy the resolution of December, 1946, which was an attempt to settle the debt of the UN to the Spanish people whose heroic struggle had contributed so much to the mobilization of democratic forces before the onslaught of the fascist hordes.

Japan's New Chance

THE general international situation, and, during the recent months, the war in Korea especially, have had a powerful effect on the economy of various countries. Thus Japan for example, as the only industrial country in the Far East, has once again seized various advantages. And not only because it supplies the United Nations troops with many products, but also because the entire world economy is today almost entirely under the influence of the armaments boom.

All this has given special incentive to the traditional Japanese export items. Japan's exports in 1949 were twice as big as they were in the previous year, while the first half of 1950 registered an increase of almost 25%. Regulations which restricted foreign trade and industrial production have been practically abolished. Japan has been given a free hand in the textile industry and its presence on nearly all the world markets is causing grave anxiety among other countries engaged in export — particularly in Great Britain. Under a recent agreement concluded between the representatives of the cotton industry of USA, Great Britain and Japan, the latter's exports were not to exceed 55% of the total Japanese production. However, it seems that Japanese producers have, on their own, decided to increase the part of production intended for export to 70%.

The world press forecasts that Japan in 1953 will succeed in improving its economic position to such an extent that it will no longer need any American assistance. In the meantime, judging by everything, Japan will in the course of this year already take top place in the world as supplier of cotton textiles.



Ksenija ILIYEVICH: A MOTIF FROM RASKA

FROM THE UNO

ON THE PROBLEM OF ASCERTAINING THE AGGRESSOR

DURING this year's session of the General Assembly, the UNO paid a great deal of attention to the problem of adopting measures which would give legal form to, and implement, an idea which has matured completely in the consciousness of the great majority of mankind, and that is the conviction that aggressive warfare is a crime against humanity.

From the first draft declaration on the rights and duties of states submitted to the French Convention in Paris in 1793 up to the present, there have been tens of declarations making it binding upon states, to one degree or another and in one form or another, to resort to peaceful means in their mutual disputes and to refrain from the use of force. An important step forward was made especially after the First World War. The Briand-Kellogg Pact and the London Protocol on Aggression liquidated from the legal point of view the old conception that every state has the right to proclaim war on another state as it wishes, and announced a new principle which condemned and prohibited resorting to force as a method of national policy.

However, increasingly frequent violation of international obligations and the events which took place before and between the two world wars prepared the ground for the idea of a world organization whose task would be to preserve international peace and security and to promote international cooperation. Thus the League of Nations was created, and it was thus that the United Nations Organization was also established later. The repetition of acts of aggression which took place after their foundation put first the one and then the other world organization to the hardest test. The League of Nations did not pass that test and left the Japanese aggressor in Manchuria and the Italian aggressor in Ethiopia unpunished, and they were followed by others. Soon it lost all significance.

The United Nations Organization has withstood that test. The UNO has not only promoted the international mechanism by proclaiming as a crime against humanity all preparation, planning and waging of aggressive warfare, but also adopted sanctions against those who are guilty of the above. The events in Korea have had the effect of consolidating and giving even more concrete form to the idea of collective action against the aggressor. The significance of this has already been demonstrated and it has become a guarantee of the effectiveness of the UNO. In the light of the UN decision to undertake collective action against the aggressor in any part of the world whatsoever lends exceptional importance to the con-

cept of condemnation of aggressive warfare and to the duties of member-states which derive from the Charter.

This decision, however, has also brought another problem into prominence — the problem of definition of the aggressor. It is clear that the rapidity with which the UN can act depends on its being able in the shortest possible time to determine the attacker on the basis of a criterion which will reduce the possible errors to a minimum. This holds true both in cases where an effective solution of a dispute by peaceful means is necessary, or where a decision must be made regarding military action against the aggressor.

Are the definitions of the aggressor found in previous international legal documents satisfactory in the present situation and do they make it possible to implement UN measures effectively? Will the Security Council, or the General Assembly, which must determine quickly and objectively who the aggressor is before swinging into action in the case of war, be able to do so on the basis of the definition of the aggressor such as stated, for example, in the Pan-American Pact on Mutual Assistance concluded in Rio de Janeiro in 1947? This Pact considers as aggression any unprovoked attack by one state against the territory, population, land, sea or air forces of another state. As is usually the case, both parties to the conflict would immediately announce that they have been attacked and that they therefore have the right to legitimate defense. In such a case, it would be rather improbable that the majority in the Security Council or in the General Assembly would be able to decide where the truth lies in the numerous, often very skillfully provoked incidents and maneuvers resorted to by the aggressor, and to undertake action.

In the second group of definitions, we have those resembling the one made in the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression of 1939, of the Harvard Institute of International Law Research. Aggression is described there as resorting to military force which represents a violation of legally undertaken obligations not to resort to such means, whereby the violation in question is established by a procedure to which the attacker agreed earlier.

According to this definition, the establishment by a procedure adopted in advance that the obligation not to resort to war has been violated becomes the criterion for deciding who the aggressor is. But does this method really make it possible to determine on time

FROM THE UNO

which is the side that is waging aggressive warfare? Since the definition does not refer to any cessation of hostilities the aggressor has a free hand to settle the matter himself by military means before any eventual collective action could be undertaken. He can do so either by making it impossible to establish who the aggressor is or by circumventing the provisions and obligations by interpreting them in his own way.

The Uruguayan definition which was proposed at the present meeting of the General Assembly of the UNO proclaims as the aggressor any country which avoids using the means suggested in the Charter for peaceful solution of disputes. How would that look in practice? Let us say that war has broken out between two states. The UNO must first decide who the aggressor is before it can undertake the necessary measures. This would be ascertained by deciding which of the two states has avoided using the means provided for by the Charter for peaceful solution of disputes. The question then comes up again of how to appraise this "avoidance" exactly, if the UN does not have any "clear and unequivocal" method for this. Finally, the aggressor will make use of all possible maneuvers to deceive international public opinion and to prove that he tried all peaceful methods but in vain, before the armed conflict broke out.

The following may be concluded from the above: firstly, because the procedure of the UN in case of an outbreak of war does not contain the obligation to cease fire and withdraw troops, it is imperative to adopt such provisions in order to make it impossible for the aggressor, by way of various kinds of maneuvers and abuse of procedure, to gain in time for the continuation and conclusion of the aggressive war; and secondly, because it is very difficult to establish who the aggressor is in the above ways since he will do everything in his power to represent his attack as legitimate defense, it is absolutely necessary to find a method whereby he will put the finger on himself publicly.

Such a "clear and unequivocal means" is the method of ascertaining the aggressor described in the Yugoslav proposal on the duties of states in case of the outbreak of hostilities which is now under consideration in the General Assembly. This proposal contains two provisions which all countries are bound to adhere to when they find themselves party to an armed conflict. The first is that all countries which find themselves in an armed conflict must make a public declaration within 24 hours after the outbreak of war operations, and to inform the UNO that they are ready to cease firing and withdraw their forces from alien territory. The second provision says that both parties to the dispute must within 48 hours actually withdraw their troops from the territory of the other state.

Non-fulfilment of these obligations would mean that the aggressor had automatically revealed him-

self as the aggressor to the whole world. This will not only make it clear to the public opinion of the world who the aggressor is but it will also facilitate and quicken the adoption of decisions by the Security Council or the General Assembly which would then be in a position to make an appraisal of the situation more easily, to determine who bears the main responsibility for the war and to take the necessary measures. And what measures it will take will be decided in each concrete case by the UNO itself.

The Yugoslav proposals, therefore, not only have moral and legal validity but practical significance as well. Their adoption would, on the one hand, make it even more difficult for any eventual aggressor to deceive the world public and the UNO on the real character of his acts. On the other hand, they would make it easier for the UNO to take effective measures by rendering impossible abuses and mistakes in the adoption of decisions to undertake suitable measures, at least insofar as they might result from the ascertainment of the aggressor. The Yugoslav proposal, therefore, is an imperative supplement to that mechanism of collective security whose foundations were laid at this General Assembly Session. It really represents an important contribution to the consolidation of international peace and international security and the strengthening of the effectiveness and the authority of the UNO.

R. B.



Djordje ANDREJEVIC-KUN : IN THE WAKE OF FASCIST RAVAGE (Woodcut)

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation in a Deadlock

HUGE expenditures envisaged for the Western European armaments programmes have once again placed into the forefront the fear of inflation and distrust in the stability of the economic strength of the Marshall Plan countries. Higher production, foreign currency reserves, coordination of prices and wages, supply of industrial raw materials, investment plans and budgetary balance, all these vital problems which it was asserted had already been in the main solved, are now once again being raised in a most acute form. Why? For the simple reason that the Atlantic Pact countries have undertaken to manufacture armaments on a large scale which will undoubtedly affect the already unstable balance of individual national economies.

William Foster, the new administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, speaking recently of the present and future significance of the Marshall Plan, declared: "The Europeans are faced with the basic problem of maintaining their economic strength, just like we are, while their (European) means are directed toward armaments... A further increase of production, further economic integration of Western European economy and further efforts to export as much as possible to the dollar zone are essential to our mutual defence."

The European Economic Council, the highest body of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, at its special session, held from the 6th to the 8th of October, adopted in the main lines the memorandum of its Secretariat on "Urgent economic questions". This document sets out the measures which the members of the Organization should undertake in connection with the new tendencies which have appeared in the world economy after the outbreak of the war in Korea and after the adoption of the Atlantic Pact countries' armaments programme.

How to suppress the danger of inflation which looms as a consequence of the armaments boom was the main subject discussed by the Council. The revision (i. e. reduction) of investment plans, that priority be given to certain branches of production while the means for the activities of all others be cut down, were planned as essential measures. The danger of inflation, contrary to Foster's statement, has increased in view of the fact that in the whole of Western Europe, with the exception of Germany and Italy, there are no unused production capacities for key products nor is there a surplus of manpower. A lower production of consumers goods — coupled with the general rise in prices, threatens — according to the "Neue Züricher Zeitung" of October 7th — to influence the attitude of the masses of the people.

And, true enough, the struggle for higher wages has again begun in most of the Western European countries. The upward spiral of inflation is once more a current matter of discussion.

The Council failed to reach agreement on another important issue, namely on the measures to suppress soaring raw material prices and to regulate their distribution. The British delegate opposed the proposal of the majority, saying that the Organization should be very cautious in passing decisions involving those raw materials for the supply of which Europe depended largely on overseas countries. There is no doubt that the present fantastic rise of prices of a large number of items from the sterling area momentarily gives Britain substantial advantages which she will not give up easily. Therefore, the decision of the Council to postpone all solution to six weeks after the special sub-committees draw up a proposal, is typical of the attempt to avoid conflicting interests which will nevertheless appear shortly in sharp form within the Organization for European Cooperation.

The possibility of acquiring dollars through the increased exports to the USA is also causing grave anxiety among the Marshall Plan countries. The representatives of different countries, in the first place Great Britain and France, have pointed out on several occasions that to increase arms production would mean automatically to reduce production designed for export. This, naturally enough, would lead to results directly opposed to those expected by Foster.

Characteristic of the latest session of the European Economic Council is the fact that very little attention was given to the regular questions on the agenda; such as the liberalization of trade, plans for the integration of European economy, draft of the annual report, work of the European Planning Union. The Marshall Plan countries, feeling grave anxiety over the latest development of economic conditions in the world, almost exclusively treated problems directly related to the impending inflation.

Will it be possible to bring the conflicting interests of the Western European countries to conform temporarily, and especially will it be possible to apply international measures under conditions where each country, faced with difficult tasks, is more inclined to individual actions for the defence of its own positions? Perhaps the above unambiguous statement made by Foster on the "further economic integration of the Western European economy" offers an answer to this question.

O. A.

The Economic Situation in the East-European Countries and the Soviet Union

SINCE the establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the economic relations between USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe have indeed hit „a new trail". Not in virtue of the forms and the character thereof, however, but exclusively in the direction of increasing USSR pressure for the economic subjugation of those countries. Foreign trade between them and the USSR started to record a sudden rise, experiencing a change in structure at the same time, while their exchanges with other countries ran into increasing difficulties. Simultaneously, references appeared to the attuning of the economic plans of these countries to the USSR and the expansion of the economic "cooperation" between them. In this way the process, which so far aimed at the introduction of control over the foreign trade of such countries, started to gain in breadth and depth, to encompass, under the pretext of "coordination" of plans and "mutual cooperation", the entire economic structure of these countries. New and more ample forms of political subjugation went hand in hand with this. The principal aim of the whole complex was to make the economies of these countries as completely subservient to the interests of Soviet economy as possible, and serve for the solving of certain of the latter's contradictions, being utilized at the same time for expanding the basis of its activities as a corner stone and starting point of political subjugation in general. In this respect, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance plays the part of the central organ through which are implemented all the plans for the economic bondage of these countries.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet leaders still do not consider as sufficient the present extent of bondage of the foreign trade of such countries, steering of late, as they do, a course directed toward their ever greater economic isolation from other countries. The sharpness of the trend imposed along those lines in the beginning of 1949 has been responsible for great economic difficulties in these countries, which only grew in volume due to their adherence to the economic blockade of Yugoslavia. The difficulties which had resulted in these countries were exploited by the USSR leaders to exert further pressure on them, professing "the freeing of their economies from capitalist markets" as the ultimate aim.

It is for such reasons that Poland's revised six-year plan envisions for 1955 a volume of exchanges with the USSR and the other Cominform countries amounting to 68 per cent. of her over-all foreign trade and even regards this percentage as minimal and talks of striving for a volume equal to more than 70 per cent. (In the 1949-55 period, her foreign trade turnover should be raised by 40 per cent., and with the USSR alone by a full 138%).

This is why Czechoslovakia and Hungary, too, are encountering increasing obstacles in their trade with other countries, why their raw material supply and the procurement of capital goods is rendered extremely difficult, causing vast upheavals which are to be solved by their further isolation from foreign markets, and the abandonment of such industrial

branches which are based on foreign raw material sources. In this manner the process of increasing subjugation of the foreign trade of the East European countries on the part of the USSR is becoming tightly strained.

The control over the foreign trade of one country by another country — especially when the latter holds a leading position — represents one of the most efficacious instruments of economic bondage. In reality, it is the starting point for complete subjugation, for the destruction of independence and sovereignty, for enslavement. The system and the methods employed by USSR in imposing such control fully corroborate the latter's exploitive and hegemonistic aims. In March last, the review "Bolshevik" (No. 6) expounded the theme of the trade exchanges between the USSR and these countries being conducted at prices which ensure its equivalence. This is not so, however. The "Zahranicni Obhod" of May 5, 1950, wrote, on the contrary, that the prices were determined on the lowest bases prevailing in the world markets, etc. The price system used by the USSR to exploit the undeveloped countries had not been abandoned, nor had any of the time-honoured methods of cheap buying and dear selling, i. e. methods of pressure dictation, blackmail, either been dropped. Hence the growing economic difficulties in these countries, which under the circumstances are able to expand their exports to the USSR exclusively at the cost of lowering the living standard of their toiling masses.

One of the methods of exhausting these countries — not mentioning the other familiar devices like the joint companies, etc. — consists of the conclusion between them and the USSR of special contracts for the supply of raw materials for processing and the re-export of the resultant finished products to the USSR. This practice is widespread, and reaches its highest volume in countries having pure Soviet or mixed companies. The contract clauses relating to the processing and delivery of finished products are so hard that their execution is associated with overwhelming efforts, demanding sacrifices in the form of additional high-grade raw materials and ingredients which have to be imported from other countries. This, apart from other matters, is the price these countries are called upon to pay for their raw material deliveries from USSR. Pursuing such a course the USSR has expanded its own production basis and has simultaneously curtailed the production and general foreign trade possibilities of the East European countries themselves. This production, in common with the execution of all the contracts with the USSR, is supervised by special officials of the Soviet enterprises — inspectors. This type of production, therefore, is given priority in all respects (raw materials, labour, foreign exchange for purchases from the West, etc.). Thus placed astride the trade exchanges developed in this manner and exercising control of foreign trade the USSR is able to impose the direction and the kind of production desired, and to influence the economic structure of these countries and the development of their productive forces not from the viewpoint of their own economic building

up but from the viewpoint of the Soviets' own economic requirements. The supervision of foreign trade was constantly accompanied by control over production generally, which means control over the entire economy. The paths followed in the process, the exploitive and hegemonistic methods applied are eloquent attestation that no unifying — logical and natural — process is involved but the process of subjugation.

In the preamble to the Polish six-year plan it is stated that it owes its establishment thanks exclusively to economic cooperation with USSR. The economic plans of the other countries of Eastern Europe are also the product of their dependence on and bondage to the USSR. This dependence was particularly accentuated in the powerful pressure exerted on these countries to effect radical changes in their plans, which had been set up in conditions of at least seeming economic independence. Poland had to plan an increase in production amounting to 158.3 per cent under the new schedule, as against 85-95 per cent which had originally been envisaged. The stress of the increase is on steel, coal and electric energy, i. e. "on the expansion of the raw material basis and the creation in the country of a raw materials basis for war industry". Hungary had to foresee 50.9 billion forints' worth of investments, as compared with the 35 billion forints originally planned. She, too, had to envisage an expansion of the raw materials basis (also cotton, in addition to others). A revision of Czechoslovakia's own plan was imposed in a similar fashion, although that country is relatively the poorest one in raw materials among the East European countries. Bulgaria and Rumania were oriented to the production of raw materials exclusively.

All these amendments of the plans and the way in which they were imposed and are implemented, the derangements caused thereby in the countries of Eastern Europe, the reasons advanced to explain away their need and conditionment — none of these things are acceptable to the workers of those countries. Their eyes are getting opened with growing clarity to the enormous difference existing between the reasons advanced by the satellite leaders in an effort to convince them about the need of such changes and of the upheavals caused, and the true reasons.


At the recent plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party reference was made to the reasons which dictated the changes in the six-year plan, the higher pace of development, etc. At the same time, the difficulties quoted in connection with foreign trade and production were of a timbre which would rather have warranted a re-planning downward with due regard for the specific conditions of development. There was evident disharmony between such difficulties and the assertion that there existed all the objective and subjective prerequisites for an increase of the scope of the six-year plan, that by her exchanges with the USSR Poland had made sure of raw material and capital goods supplies, and so on. The mere reference to the special difficulties encountered in balancing trade indicates that foreign trade, primarily with the USSR, is not running smoothly. The conduct of foreign trade under such conditions requires great sacrifices, it demands the partial sacrificing of the living standard, and thereby finds itself at odds with one of the fundamental principles of socialist construction — the principle of an improved living standard.

This is best suggested by an example dealt with by the Polish press, "the entanglement of Polish leaders in explaining the rise" in the living standard. The explanation at one point dwells on increased production of consumer goods for the purpose of an improved living standard. When this is linked up with the percentages subsequently advanced in support of the latter improvement, it is seen that the bulk of increased production is really designated for export to the USSR. The balance remaining for the domestic market in no case projects itself favourably as regards an improved living standard owing to the intervening increase in the number of inhabitants.

In order to meet the USSR demands, Hungary was forced to hit out at the living standard of workers, proclaiming the working class to be squanderers who are careless of their future. The government of that country was, therefore, obliged to revert to the system of ration cards for staple produce. This was followed by orders to prevent the formation of queues outside stores, etc. The gravity of the situation can be gauged by the breadth of the action against profiteers, under which category have been listed even many state enterprises, by the pending court trials etc. Propaganda tries to explain the decline in the living standard by profiteering (although no explanation is offered as to why profiteering should appear precisely in the wake of Varga's counsels and the stand overtly adopted by the Hungarian leaders against a high living standard) and the weapon for combatting it is sought in law suits.

The question of the living standard has become the central issue in the countries of Eastern Europe, and it is leading to growing differences between the leaders — i. e. those who blindly obey and implement the directives of the Cominform — and the working masses, who are beginning to experience across their own backs the costs of the loss of independence and sovereignty of their countries, and to realize that what is actually being faced are not the efforts and sacrifices for the building of socialism, but the burdens imposed by a stepped-up exploitation on the part of USSR.

M. VELJIC



Milorad PEŠIĆ: IN THE FOUNDRY

LETTER FROM ITALY

CRISIS IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF ITALY

PIETRO Nenni's Socialist Party (the PSI) is in the throes of a serious crisis which is the consequence of the growing subjugation of the PSI to the Communist Party of Italy and the Cominform. Certain leaders of the PSI had earlier left the party, rallying around themselves the wavering elements and creating separate organizations such as the PSU (Socialist Party of Unity) and the PSLI (Socialist Workers' Party of Italy).

Since the PSI holds itself to be a Marxist workers party it was only natural to expect that it would strengthen itself after the wavering elements had fallen away, and that it would win back to its ranks those members whom opportunists had succeeded in misleading. However, the contrary occurred and the PSI ranks are continuing to dwindle with the crisis in the Party becoming more acute.

The working masses which followed Nenni in the wish to cooperate with the Communists and to fight for the unity of the Italian working class thought the struggle for unity to mean at the same time the struggle for equality, considered that the struggle of the Italian proletariat should in the first place be in keeping with the interests of the Italian working class. However, the PSI's leadership took the view that cooperation with the Communists meant backing the Communist Party of Italy in all its manoeuvres even when they ran counter to the vital interests of the Italian proletariat. The PSI's leadership headed by Nenni thus blindly adopted all instructions coming from the Communist Party of Italy, that is from the USSR. This policy has resulted in further splits in the PSI with the best elements now leaving its ranks instead of opportunists.

What still holds the members of PSI together today is no longer the conscious discipline nor the desire to create a united workers' front, but simply fear in the face of the intricate international situation and the possibility of a new world conflict.

The USSR's unprincipled and inconsistent attitude on many important issues, with the Communist Party of Italy and the PSI closely following in its footsteps, has aroused the masses, while the hesitant and incorrect stand towards the war in Korea has only brought out more sharply the conflicting views within the party.

A congress of the PSI was to have been held in September this year. However, in view of the situation among the party rank and file, the leadership thought it best to postpone the Congress to sometime in December. Pursuing the Cominform policy, the leadership inevitably had to take to Cominform methods as well. The tendency to bring organizational questions out into the forefront and suppress questions of ideological and political work with the purpose of avoiding discussion on them, was clearly manifested at the preparations for provincial congresses — at which delegates to the National Congress are to be elected.

As this tendency has met with the resistance of sincere champions of socialism, the Cominform leadership has given an initiative for the "purge" of undesirable elements, in the first place of unsubmitive members of the various federations. The reasons given for expulsions or dismissals were "deviations" and similar arguments. The object of those manoeuvres

was to remove from the leaderships of the federations those who were against blind subjugation of the PSI to the Communist Party of Italy and to the Cominform policy, those who stood for equality and independence in pursuing a policy best corresponding to the interests of the broadest masses of the Italian people. Thus Lelio Basso, a member of the Party's Executive was compelled to resign his post and pledge himself not to accept candidacy for a member of the Executive at the forthcoming Congress, because he had "worked towards organizing opposition to the leadership at the Party Congress. Basso's adherents, have been expelled (Niseglie, for example, in the province of Bari). In Sicily, the mayor of Ragusa and two hundred peasants left the PSI owing to the unbearable dictatorship of the leadership, who, they declared, "have betrayed socialism with their subjugation to Togliatti and Moscow."

As opposed to earlier secessions from the Party which at the same time actually strengthened it, today there is a danger of the best elements leaving the PSI. In view of this danger the wrath of the Cominform leadership has been levelled especially at the so-called centrists. Whereas the usual centre in a workers' movement constitutes its wavering part, prepared to serve the bourgeoisie, in the PSI the centrists are fighting for equal relations among parties and for socialism. They hold the view that the leading role in a revolution belongs not to the state, but to the proletariat. They recognize the great merits of the Russian proletariat, which was the first to carry through a socialist revolution, but also consider that the foreign policy and interests of the Soviet Union do not always coincide with the interests of the Italian proletariat. They hold that Italy's neutrality is the best course in the struggle for peace in the world, and oppose the division of the world into blocs.

Despite the fact that the centrists are still dependent on Nenni's Cominform group, their ideas arouse the fears of the Party's leadership, because these have met with response among the masses. Drastic measures have therefore been taken against the centrists. The centrist movement is undoubtedly strongest in Northern Italy, where a paper, "Giorni Presenti" has been started. This paper demands Italy's neutrality in international combinations. The view that neutrality best corresponds to the interests of the Italian people and to the cause of socialism, has been set out in the paper by Alberto Jacometti, one of the centrist leaders. The Cominform leadership of the Party, headed by Lizzadri and Marandi, has sharply condemned this attitude, adhering to the view of unconditional linking with the Eastern bloc. Although the line of this paper has not yet been crystallized, although it has not yet adopted a definite attitude to the leadership of the PSI, the latter has forbidden its members to cooperate in it and has termed it a "Titoist" paper. It is endeavouring to stifle with all means at its disposal the very thought of the possibility of conducting an independent policy. But all these measures of the Cominform leadership have failed to suppress the rank and file's desire for independent policy, which is the reason why the crisis in the Socialist Party of Italy is growing more acute.

F.K.

THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA

HOW THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING
"STABBED IN THE BACK"

A BULGARIAN COLONEL, Aleksandar Getman, gave the Bulgarian Communist Party newspaper, "Rabotničesko Delo", his contribution to the list of Yugoslav "Stabs in the back" to the Soviet Union.

The article which enriches that list bears the title "How Tito helped Hitler and facilitated Churchill's plans". It is illustrated, as we learn from a Sofia radio broadcast of October 16, by the facsimile of a letter with the signature of Yugoslav General Tempo sent to the commander of the Bulgarian army on the Kriva Palanka sector on October 7, 1944. According to the Sofia radio, this letter contains the most important and the most convincing proof of the assertions made by the author in his article. This proof is to be found in a sentence which reads as follows.

"I am drawing your attention to the fact that we will be forced to defend our villages with our own forces if your army continues to plunder them."

Here is the document, and a written and signed document at that, about the Yugoslav services to Hitler and Churchill! Here are proofs that Yugoslavia was, in October 1944 — concludes Colonel Getman from this letter — "Stabbing the glorious Soviet liberating Army in the back."

We have so far been acquainted with various ways in which the Soviet Union has been stabbed in the back. From the period of the Yugoslav National Liberation Struggle we know that the Yugoslav leaders called it a stab in the back when Yugoslav acts at that time did not coincide with the Soviet — British "gentlemen's agreements" about division of spheres of influ-

ence and specially with the Stalin war", writes Ehrenburg, "in attempting to justify the increase of armaments, the bigger armies and the large-scale war maneuvers, are repeating Goebbels' words. Of course, they talk only of defense. But did Goebbels, Goerring and the "Fuehrer" ever talk about anything else?"

— Churchill bargain about the division of spheres of influence in Yugoslavia on a 50-50 basis. From the present Cominform propaganda we are again learning about another form of back-stabbing which is similar to that now being revealed to us by Colonel Getman. It consists of disagreement with the exploitation of small socialist states by the big "leading Socialist State". But Colonel Getman succeeded in drawing out the possibilities of this criminal activity against the USSR to an undreamed-of extent. The Soviet Union, he tells us, can be stabbed in the back not only by the act of not agreeing, in peacetime, to indirect exploitation, through joint companies, for instance, but also by preventing the plundering of one's own villages by the Bulgarian soldiers.

"Rabotničesko Delo", which published this article, agrees with the opinion of Colonel Getman. The Sofia radio also agrees and it broadcast this article. The only thing we do not know is if this Bulgarian appropriation of another's prerogative will be agreed to by — the foreign trade executives of the Soviet Union.

ILYA EHRENBURG, wrote an article in the "Pravda" about a subject which he really knows like his abc's: hypocrisy and false propaganda. The article is entitled "Reproach" and it says that the methods of Hitler and Goebbels did not die with them and that they are today serving those who are dreaming about war.

This idea is a completely correct one. Also correct is his observation that the main trick being used by the people today is — false fear of others. "The present instigators of

war", writes Ehrenburg, "in attempting to justify the increase of armaments, the bigger armies and the large-scale war maneuvers, are repeating Goebbels' words. Of course, they talk only of defense. But did Goebbels, Goerring and the "Fuehrer" ever talk about anything else?"

After this point, in order to avoid having his readers in the Cominform countries think even for a moment that he is indulging in any kind of double-talk, Ilya Ehrenburg makes it clear who he is referring to: "Aren't Mr. Truman and his European sheriffs now doing the same thing?", he asks.

There is a reason for the experienced Ehrenburg's caution. If he had not written this last sentence his readers in the Cominform countries could easily get the idea that he was perfidiously alluding to the leaders of their countries and to Cominform propaganda. Although such an idea by Ehrenburg's readers would in any case be a mistaken one, for it would be hard to imagine that he would dare to try to slip something like this over, there would be a great deal of truth in their first impression. While Ehrenburg did not attack the Cominform leaders, he must have gotten the idea for his article from their propaganda (because that is the best place to get it). The words of Cominform politicians, journalists and other propagandists are such a good illustration of his words on the methods of war propaganda that it would be hard to imagine better ones. For a few months already, the readers of the Cominform newspapers and the listeners to the programs of the Cominform radio stations have been reading and listening to this;

"There are secret agreements between Wall Street and Tito. A

THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA

new axis is being forged for the extermination of peaceful people." (From the Moscow "Literaturnaya Gazeta" of October 4th).

"In Yugoslavia every third man is in military uniform." (Radio Sofia, October 9th).

"Tito's clique is grinding its teeth at us and making preparations against us. It is making ready for the disembarkation of American troops in Yugoslavia." (Radio Budapest, October 26).

"Tito's regime is menacing our borders." (From the Hungarian newspaper "Nepszava", October 26).

And so on, day after day.

"Of course", as Ehrenburg says, "they all talk exclusively about defense. But", to adhere to the words of Ehrenburg, "did Goebbels, Goerring and the "Fuehrer" ever talk about anything else?"

THE VOTING ON TRYGVE LIE was one of the more important events in Flushing Meadows which was not, as far as we could see, accompanied in the Cominform press by the compulsory conclusion that Yugoslavia has gone over to the imperialist camp. The non-exploitation of such a wonderful motive for that conclusion is all the stranger since it was precisely the Yugoslav delegate who proposed that Trygve Lie should again be elected Secretary-General of the United Nations, and because he stood by his opinion during the voting when nine of the eleven Security Council members voted for Lie.

Why did the Cominform let such a wonderful chance go by? Here is why: the Soviet delegate was not alone. Of the two who did not vote for Trygve Lie, apart from the Soviet delegate, there was one who abstained from voting and that was — the delegate from Chiang Kai-shek's China.

The customary Cominform phrase "birds of a feather flock together" had to be omitted this time. A similar fate was suffered by the

phrase on "camps". For otherwise the confused Cominform newsmen would be wondering how to explain which one of the two had gone over to whose camp: did Chiang Kai-shek's China join the Cominform camp or did the USSR go over to the Kuomintang?

THE QUESTION OF WAR OR PEACE with its neighbors seems to have become a purely internal matter for Italy. At least that is what we learn from an article written by the Italian Cominformist, Luigi Longo.

This Longo, as Central Committee Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, published in the Party newspaper "Unita" a declaration by the leaders of the Italian Communist Party on the country's international position. The declaration says that the only country in Europe with whom Italy might go to war is Yugoslavia. When the Yugoslav Envoy in Rome answered this declaration, describing it as provocative, Longo launched a new theory. He wrote the following in the Party newspaper, word for word: "The document of our Party leadership provoked a statement by the Yugoslav Minister in Rome, Mr. Iveković. It seems impermissible to us for this gentleman to be interfering in this manner in a debate between Italian political parties on Italian problems."

This new Cominform theory is, undoubtedly, an original one. Only if it were adopted by the non-Cominform circles in the world, what a lovely future for mankind! Happily, they will not adopt it. That they will not adopt it and that it will remain the property of the Cominform is proven by the reaction of the delegations from the majority of the countries in the United Nations to the danger of war. Many bad things and many good ones can be said about these reactions. But they do undoubtedly show one thing, and that is that the peoples of the world will not in any case agree to Longo's Cominform theories to the effect that the

question of who will war with whom — is the internal affair of each individual country.

THE NEW DIVISION OF BULGARIA was the subject of a very exciting communique by the Tass Agency not long ago. This communique was immediately published, accompanied by indignant commentaries, first by "Izvestia" and "Literaturnaya Gazeta" and then by the Italian newspapers "Avanti" and "Paese", followed by the rest of the newspapers and radio stations of the Cominform.

The Soviet Agency communique reads that the "Americans have offered Tito half of Bulgaria."

The member of the Cominform propaganda machine who thought this one up is not a bad propagandist. He knew that it would inevitably cause indignation among all followers of the policy of the Soviet leaders. Not because someone is presenting someone else with foreign territory. Not because of that, for this is only the right of the great. But how dare a great power, America, divide up a country which other big powers, the USSR and Great Britain, have already divided up among themselves. Since Stalin and Churchill had already divided Bulgaria up into spheres of interest on an 80-20 basis in 1944, how could Acheson be so bold as to carry out a new division?

D. T.

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Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

THIS IS AN ENCLOSURE
NOT DETACH

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BEOGRAD, OCTOBER 25, 1950

On United Nations Day (by Josip Broz Tito)

FROM THE UNO:

Authority of UN General Assembly Expanded

International Financing of Under-developed Countries

France and the Integration of Western Germany

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The USSR Against Collective Security

The Position of the Soviet Bloc on the Genocide Convention

A Propaganda Move by Eight Cominform Ministers in Prague

The UNICEF Before the General Assembly

The "Elections" in Eastern Germany

LIFE IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA:

Voters' Assemblies — An Expression of Direct Democracy

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:

On the Eve of Elections to the Congress

Economic and Financial Situation in Italy

EDITORS: DUSHAN TIMOTIYEVICH AND ZDRAVKO PECHAR

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LOCAL AND FOREIGN WRITERS ON
VARIOUS PROBLEMS IN INTERNA-
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EVERY EVIL HAS ITS VIRTUE

The only ones who did not vote for
Trigve Lie in the Security Council were
the Soviet and the Kuomintang delegates.



— IT'S KIND OF NICE YOUR STILL BEING AROUND
("Jež" — Beograd)

Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

ON UNITED NATIONS DAY¹⁾

by Josip Broz Tito

THE entire world today trembles at the thought that there might be a Third World War and that is why the eyes of the people of all lands are fixed on the United Nations Organization. The question is will the United Nations be able to prevent a new world war and secure the peace, and how will it be able to do so. It must be admitted that this question is being posed with a certain amount of scepticism, which is justified if we take a quick glance at the not far distant past — for people compare the events that preceded the Second World War, including, unfortunately, the finale of the League of Nations, which had a role similar to that of the present United Nations Organization, with phenomena that are occurring now. In my opinion, however, one can look with more assurance today at the future, at the success of the mission of the United Nations Organization, regardless of certain shortcomings and weak points in it.

Recently, it has been a relief to see that responsible statesmen have drawn certain conclusions from the unfortunate past and are now more courageous in seeking ways and means to make new aggression, a new world war, impossible. The high cost of the experience of the past, with all the consequences of the Second World War, must serve us this time in the consistent and persistent search for peaceful ways to settle all international problems through the new world organization, that is, through the United Nations. In order to achieve this goal, we must not only make the greatest effort but even greater sacrifices, according to necessity, in order to strengthen the United Nations as much as possible so that it can be capable of eliminating the danger of war which is again threatening mankind.

In order to have the United Nations really capable of fulfilling its great mission, it is ne-

cessary for that organization to be resolute and determined in the face of any attempt — regardless of its source — to menace the independence of the peoples or to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, big or small.

Finally, I should like to emphasize one thing, and that is the existence of dangerous tendencies to have all important international problems settled only by a few big powers, meaning that the representatives of other small and big member-states of the United Nations are ignored in the adoption of significant decisions which affect other countries. Such a practice would also threaten the existence of the United Nations Organization itself, and peace would not be saved that way at all. Only the full cooperation of all members of the United Nations on all questions and equality among them can consolidate that organization and render it capable of carrying out its mission, the mission which the peoples of the world expect it to fulfil, and that is: to preserve peace in the world and to solve all the still unsettled problems with the greatest possible justice. In expressing this wish, I am certain that it is the desire not only of the peoples of Yugoslavia, but the peoples of all lands.

I can underline again on this occasion that the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will support the preservation of peace with all its might. It will use every opportunity to work for the consolidation of the United Nations for it considers that it is possible to save the peace and strengthen cooperation among the peoples of the world only through that organization.

¹⁾ This article appeared in the newspaper "Borba" on October the 24th

EDITORIAL COMMENT

THE USSR AGAINST COLLECTIVE SECURITY

(Report from New York)

IN his many sallies in the Political Committee, the chief of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Vishinsky, clearly supported the view that the United Nations can oppose only such acts of aggression against which are opposed all the great powers. The Soviet Union disputes the right of UN to combat every act of aggression. An unconditional requisite for UN action against an aggressor — according to the assertions of the Soviet delegate — is an endorsement by all the five great powers. In the event of an obvious act of aggression, and in the absence of authorization from all the great powers for collective action against the aggressor, the United Nations absolutely must leave the victim of aggression to the mercy of the aggressor. Such is the essence of the Soviet delegation's attitude.

Vishinsky has employed all his rhetorical, juridical and political abilities to knock over the premise regarding unconditional action by UN against any act of aggression, a premise whose practical application would be as follows: If the "X" state should attack the "Y" state, the UN is bound to go into instant action against the "X" state, that is, against the aggressor, and in aid of the "Y" state, namely the victim of aggression. According to the UN Charter, action against the aggressor should be instituted by the Security Council. However, supposing the Council is unable to do that. It is unable to act that way because one permanent member of the Council supports the aggressor and vetoes all decisions of the Security Council for action against the aggressor. Would the sixty members of the United Nations be thus absolved from their obligations with regard to the preservation of peace? The General Assembly, in which the representatives of sixty countries enjoy equal rights, is bound to call at once for collective action against the aggressor

and in aid of the victim of aggression.

Vishinsky claims that the General Assembly's call for collective action against an aggressor would constitute a crude violation of the Charter, since it explicitly states that the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace rests with the Security Council and, therefore, not with the General Assembly. According to Vishinsky's arguments, it would appear that an act of aggression, as long as it is supported by some great power, does not constitute a violation of the Charter, according to the UN Charter, the great power is entitled to use its veto in the Security Council regarding the Council's decision for action against the aggressor; the permanent member of the Council has the right to protect the aggressor; the Charter allows the permanent member of the Council to enable the aggressor to achieve his goal.

How does this Soviet interpretation of the Charter agree with its Article Number One, which establishes that: "UNO has the following objectives: firstly, to preserve international peace and security, and to that end to undertake effective collective measures for the prevention of any threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression and of other violations of peace".

Why is the Soviet delegate so resolute in his stand against the very notion of the Security Council's being bound to oppose unconditionally every type of aggression? Why is he especially against the adoption of such measures which would afford to peoples a certain guarantee that the Security Council would in effect oppose any act of aggression?

Or is the obligation of the Security Council to resist unconditionally any act of aggression perhaps contrary to the interests of world peace?

Is the attitude of the Soviet delegation not giving rise to the question: and what are the intentions of the USSR?

In the Political Committee, the proposal was debated that in the event of an emergency, e. g. the outbreak of aggression, the General Assembly should at once be summoned to meet within 24 hours in an extraordinary session. The USSR Foreign Minister Vishinsky opposed this, asserting that 24 hours was too short a notice and that the extraordinary session of the General Assembly could convene within 14 days. The Soviet delegation even submitted a formal proposal to that effect.

Why is the Soviet delegation against an urgent summoning of the General Assembly in the event of aggression? Why does it ask that at least a fortnight should be allowed to elapse from the moment of the outbreak of aggression until the actual convening of the General Assembly?

Vishinsky offered the following explanation: "I may happen to be in Azerbaijan. How am I to reach New York in 24 hours? It cannot be done by ordinary methods of conveyance (railways and ships). It is even difficult to make such a trip by air... Under such circumstances, therefore, the extraordinary session of the General Assembly would present a special composition. It might be composed of the legitimate representatives of states, but it would certainly not be composed of representatives specially fitted for the task, although the uncommon conditions require specially prepared and qualified representatives. I, therefore, consider a fortnight to be necessary for the meeting of the extraordinary session of the General Assembly".

Is this explanation of Vishinsky's to be regarded as satisfactory? Let us not overlook the fact that such

technical reasons are advanced by the representative of a state having a permanent multitudinous delegation in the UNO headquarters.

In this connection, it is hard to escape the question: what are the intentions harboured by the Soviet leadership if the latter's representative demands that the extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly be called only 14 days after the act of aggression had been committed?

In all his sallies against the principle of the United Nations being bound to oppose any aggression, Vishinsky has been advancing the thesis that the responsibility for world peace rests solely with the great powers and that world peace only means peace between the great powers. The General Assembly was given an opportunity this time to see with even greater clarity the magnitude of the contempt in which the vital interests and the role of the small and medium countries are held by the USSR, which treats them like the property of the one or the other great power.

Dealing with the declaration of the representative of Cuba, who noted the USSR's disregard of the role of small nations in the maintenance of peace, Vishinsky scornfully said: "As to whether you, Cubans, exist or do not exist, is of little concern to us".

The Soviet Foreign Minister reiterated in the Political Committee the thesis whereby the entire task of the UN General Assembly regarding world peace came down to securing peace between the great powers and for the great powers. He rose against the General Assembly's dealing with the question of collective security, that question not entering within the scope of the great powers' policy. Instead of dealing with the question, the General Assembly should restrict itself to appealing to the great powers to institute negotiations outside the UNO, to solve their mutual disputes outside the UNO and to cope by themselves, without the participation of other nations, with the problem of world peace.

In putting forward this thesis, Vishinsky, true enough, interpolated an occasional reference to the "equality of peoples". But what is to be said about this "principled" Soviet stand regarding respect for the equality of peoples if it is viewed in the light of the over-all Soviet stand toward the question of world peace?

An analysis of Vishinsky's latest speeches reveals that the Soviet delegation resolutely supports the principle that the UNO has not been created for the protection of an indivisible world peace, but for the protection of the interests of the great powers, which dispose of the veto for the purpose. It follows then: should one great power find aggression useful under a determinate set of conditions, the United Nations must not oppose such aggression since such opposition would in that case be contrary to the interests of determinate great powers, and the fundamental task of UNO consists of preserving the interests of the great powers.

Jože SMOLE

The Position of the Soviet Bloc on the Genocide Convention

TWENTY-TWO states have so far unreservedly ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was unanimously adopted at the Third Session of the UN General Assembly in Paris, 1948. It therefore comes into effect, pursuant to Article 21, which is a successful ending to the work on some exceptionally important material from the field of international criminal law. The UN undertook this work almost five years ago and since then the problem has passed through various of its organs. This is an international instruments which interests almost everyone in the world, because it

provides for the prevention and punishment of one of the gravest crimes against mankind.

The USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria ratified the Convention with reservations attached to Article 9, which provides that the International Court of Justice will decide cases of dispute among the contracting parties regarding the application, interpretation or implementation of the Convention, which includes the responsibility of states on the question of genocide. It is obvious that this Article of the Convention is an essential part of the whole. Without recognition of some forum to decide such cases, the application of the Convention would be left to the arbitrary inclination of each State so that it would, in effect, no longer guarantee effective application. The question comes up, then, of whether a Convention of this sort has any meaning without the foregoing clause.

By their reservation, the countries of the Soviet bloc have taken up a legally erroneous point of view to the effect that such reservation is permissible in view of the sovereignty of the various states which can adopt whatever suits them in any Convention. However, in international law today, the point of view prevails that there can be reservations regarding multi-lateral international treaties only when they are provided for explicitly by the treaty itself, or, if they are recognized by all the other signatories. This point of view was supported by Soviet legal science, too, until recently. States are sovereign insofar as they can decide whether or not to ratify a treaty, but they cannot consider that they have ratified it if they place unilateral reservations on it. The UN Commission on International Law adopted this point of view at its last session in July this year, in Geneva.

The Soviet bloc states have not, therefore, really adopted the Convention on Genocide which is, apart

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from the Nuremberg principles, one of the most progressive achievements of international criminal law so far. The question comes up of why they did this.

The reply must be sought in the earlier stand of the USSR on this Convention and in certain political and social facts about the USSR. As regards the adoption of this Convention, the USSR had a very irresolute stand up to the spring of 1948, suggesting constant postponements and further study. When it decided in favor of the Convention in principle, the USSR brought forward, apart from certain progressive proposals, various recommendations which tended to narrow the scope of the Convention. For instance, it sought that the concept of genocide be connected exclusively with Nazism and fascism, although it is a fact that this crime emerged on the scene even before fascism, and that it exists even today. It also sought that the resettlement of national and ethnical groups should not be qualified as genocide by the Convention (and it was not included), and that the forcible resettlement of the children of one group with another should also not be included (which it was, however). The Soviet Union also asked that the Convention should give no special protection to religious groups although it is a well-known fact that it is precisely such groups that have often been subjected to horrible persecution and extermination.

At the Fourth General Assembly Session, the delegate from Great Britain brought out the cases of forcible resettlement of entire nations in the USSR, pointing out the genocidal character of such acts. If we add to this cases of persecution of people belonging to the nationalities of Yugoslavia in the Cominform countries, the forcible detention of our children in the USSR, and similar things, all of which are acts bordering on genocidal tendencies at the very least, then it becomes clear why the Soviet Union and the countries of the Soviet bloc did not really want to become parties to the Convention on Genocide.

A Propaganda Move by Eight Cominform Ministers in Prague

JUDGING by all appearances, the sudden conference of the Cominform Foreign Ministers, which was also attended by the East-German Foreign Secretary as an equal partner, was hardly confronted by a complicated task as it convened in Prague on the 20th and 21st of this month. The conference adopted a resolution which, in a manner of speaking, represented a retort to the decisions on the remilitarization of Germany of the New York meeting of Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers, on September 21st this year.

All the circumstances surrounding this conference point to its demonstrative character rather than to its constituting any serious contribution toward the solution of the German problem. In order, however, to secure the maximum amount of publicity and to produce the necessary effect abroad, the organisers of the conference took pains to shroud it in mystery, using such stunts as the ban on the landing of foreign airplanes on the Prague aerodrome, and diverse other "precautions", during the stay of the Soviet and of the satellite ministers in Prague.

As for the resolution of the eight Cominform ministers itself, it really amounts to no more than a compilation of the declaration of the ministers of East-European countries made at their June 1948 session in Warsaw. Only, at that time the issue of the creation of a West-German State was involved, i. e. it was a hit-back at the London conference of the foreign ministers of the three Western Powers, whereas now the underlying motive is the remilitarization of Western Germany, that is, the New York decision of those same three Powers. In spite of the routine phrases on the pattern of the Stockholm Appeal, the current declaration is far more guarded than its Warsaw predecessor. Its tone was undoubtedly influenced by the events in Korea, in the shadow of

which the entire Soviet policy is momentarily unfolding.

The Prague resolution, however, viewed from the Soviet angle, has a sense of its own. The Soviets, by interposing a declarative condemnation of the remilitarization of Germany, needed to conceal their own present and future militarization measures in Eastern Germany, which measures, viewed realistically, are not a whit lesser in scope than those in the West.

In addition to its other designation, an armed Eastern Germany is to serve the USSR for internal uses as well. That is to say, even in the event of a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany — Poland and Czechoslovakia would be much easier kept within the orbit of the "Brotherly Cominform countries" with an armed Eastern Germany ranged alongside, than would otherwise be the case.

Notwithstanding the obvious Soviet non-adherence to the Allies's decisions on Germany and non-manifestation of a desire for the conclusion of the peace treaty in concert with them, the Prague resolution proclaims the decisions made in New York as unlawful, at cross-purposes with the Potsdam Agreement, and makes the three Western Powers responsible for the non-conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany.

The closing sentence of the Prague resolution reveals best its propaganda character. It says that "the eight signatory-nations shall do all within their power to facilitate the solving of the pressing task — the reaching of a treaty of peace and of Germany's union". The resolution actually contains no tangible proposal to that effect, nor is there any expression of goodwill. On the contrary, all of its eleven pages radiate only propaganda and nothing else. It takes more than such and similar resolutions, therefore, to bring about a solution of international problems. It takes tangible proposals and agreements, preceded by the necessary manifestations of goodwill.

The UNICEF Comes up for Discussion Before the General Assembly

DAILY assistance in food and health services for 8 million children and TBC vaccination of 10 million children in 54 countries of Europe, Asia and Latin America — that in one sentence are the results of the humanitarian activities of the International Children's Emergency Fund during the three years of its existence. Undoubtedly these are activities which more than any other contributed towards strengthening and developing cooperation among peoples.

However, perhaps because of the very nature of this success, efforts are now being renewed from several sides to liquidate the Fund.

The attitude of the so-called countries of socialism and people's democracy towards the humanitarian activities of the UNICEF deserves to be mentioned first because of its absurdity. The Soviet Union has so far not contributed a single penny of the 148 million dollars turned over to the Fund by the governments of 43 states, including private donations. Similarly the USSR has not sent one single pound of the 225,000 tons of food and several thousand tons of footwear, clothes, sanitary material and milk processing installations contributed by 35 countries. And not only that, but from the end of September this year, the Soviet and Eastern European representatives boycotted all the sessions and meetings of the International Children's Emergency Fund, allegedly because the Kuomintang delegate was present at them, although the UNICEF's work also extends to the People's Republic of China, for which it approved the sum of 2 million dollars this year. The work of the Fund has also been obstructed in Eastern Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania.

The policy of the Soviet bloc towards the International Children's Emergency Fund not only badly reduced its efficacy but also provided a powerful support to all those who this year again attempted to complicate the structure of the

Fund by proposing technical assistance instead of direct aid in kind, and who endeavoured to restrict the UNICEF's action by transferring its finances to the UNO's budget. It is regrettable that a proposal to this effect came from the USA, which contributed comparatively the most to the success of the Fund and for which this contribution is a proportionally small expenditure in comparison with the benefits it offers to other countries.

However, these proposals once again, as they had done in the past, encountered the powerful resistance and condemnation of small and medium countries which were in favour of the UNICEF continuing its work on the basis of extending concrete material assistance. The Australian Resolution and the Yugoslav amendments submitted in this respect, won the support of the Asian countries in the first place of India, Indonesia and Pakistan. Despite open and concealed opposition the above proposals were adopted by the Social Committee and will undoubtedly be approved by the General Assembly Plenum as well.

THE POLISH DELEGATE TO UNO...



... SNAPPED IN THE ACT OF ARTICULATING THE WORD: YUGOSLAVIA ("Jež" — Beograd)

The "Elections" in Eastern Germany

ON October 15 elections were held in Eastern Germany whose purpose was to accord retrospective confirmation to the Provisional National Assembly and the East German Government. These elections were due to be held as far back as October 1949 under the constitution. At that time they were postponed for a whole year. The elections, therefore, had not taken place at a time prescribed by the constitution, but when it suited the government to do so.

Contrary to the 1946 ballot, at this year's elections the existing political parties in the Eastern Zone did not have their separate lists of candidates. Imposed was one exclusive list, namely, the list of the so-called National Front. The phenomenon, however, amounted to a further violation of the constitution of the East Zone (Article 51 of the constitution explicitly provides that the elections must be carried out in accordance with the election right by proportion) and at the same time represented an artificial measure far removed from the present-day social structure of Eastern Germany. In the Eastern Zone of Germany, where the major portion of economy is still in the hands of private capitalists and where only those large estates which exceed 100 hectares in area have been split up, and where, moreover, no revolution of any sort had taken place, the "National Front" in no case expresses the will of the people. The setting up of a single list of candidates therefore plainly stands out as artificiality engineered from above.

Due to this it had become necessary to resort to different expedients to groom the populace for the single list idea. The eve of the elections was marked by thorough purgings not only inside the United Socialist Party but also in the Christian-Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Party. The object of the purges indubitably was to stir up uneasiness and fear among the population, which is precisely what the

EDITORIAL COMMENT

leading bureaucrats and their Soviet masters needed so as to secure favourable election results for themselves. The same purpose was served by the widespread campaign for the so-called "alertness", which was specially intensified just prior to the actual voting.

Other measures were also synchronized to "win over" the population. Some weeks before the elections different laws were enacted which would merit warm acclaim — had they not been so overtly designed to corrupt the population. Thus, there was launched the legislation on the granting of credits to small farmers, as well as on the disbursement of dues to incapacitated individuals under old claims. However, immediately after the publication of such laws — and even during the relative debate in the East German Parliament — it was persistently emphasised that those standing to benefit from now on by such concessions had the duty of expressing their gratitude on October 15th by casting their votes for the "National Front".

The story did not end there, however. A few days before the elections a campaign was staged favouring public ballot. This campaign was encouraged in a declaration by the State Secretary for Home Affairs, Herbert Varnke. With the discarding of the secret ballot even the last democratic mask had been scrapped, and it must not be overlooked — for the sake of a complete picture — that the candidates of the "National Front" were not proposed for election at voters' rallies, but were the product of inter-fractional agreements between party leaderships, which adhered to a determinate key in effecting the operation.

The postponement of the elections, the imposing of an artificial unified list, the "purges" and corrupt election practices, the undemocratic method of nominations and the abandonment of the secret ballot — those were the features of the elections, which the Deputy Premier, Walter Ulbricht, characterized as "the first democratic elections in German history".

Labour Party Congress in Margate

THE Labour Party Congress was held in Margate from October 2 to 6, 1949. The February elections this year considerably reduced the strength of the Labour Party in Parliament where it has recently had a majority of only 5 to 6 votes.

Despite hints of differences inside the Party itself on questions of nationalization and the new elections, which were particularly emphasized by the Conservatives, the Labour Party Congress in Margate demonstrated considerable unanimity on all questions and there was no organized opposition at the Congress whatsoever. It was noticeable, however, that the popularity of the left wing of the Party had been growing constantly since 1945. The members of the "keep left" group, Jan Mikardo and Barbara Castle, were elected to the new Executive Committee while Aneurin Bevan, the leader of that wing, received the greatest support from the delegates to the Congress. At the conference, he himself underlined the unity of the Party, saying: "We will come out before the British people in the general elections as a united party — and I am saying that intentionally".

That unity was demonstrated during the consideration of questions of foreign policy and especially in the discussion on the program declaration which bears the title: "Labour and the New Society".

The discussion of foreign policy was rather lively. President Sam Watson took part as did Minister of Defense Shinwell and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bevin who flew to the Congress from the United Nations Assembly. It was apparent that Bevin had never had so much support for his policy within the Party itself as he had this time.

The greatest unity was manifested in the discussion on the program, "Labour and the New Society". Answering the objections that the program did not contain any concrete measures regarding nationalization, as had been the case since 1946, Mor-

ison stated that this intention had not been abandoned but that the situation at this particular moment was not a suitable one for the adoption of such decisions. He emphasized that the program contained principles and not concrete measures. The program "Labour and the New Society" was adopted unanimously after the speech delivered by Health Minister Bevan, who came out in support of economic assistance for undeveloped countries and brought out the services of the Labour Party in that field.

As far as economic policy was concerned, the conference did not bring out any new points while discussion itself mainly emphasized the successes which had been achieved by the Labour Government. The difficulties of the new defense program were underlined and a thesis already put forward by the Trade Union Congress was repeated — that it was necessary to curb profits and thus to find a source of funds for armaments without undertaking to restrict wages. The Conservatives reacted sharply to this both through the press and at their own congress which was held shortly after the Congress in Margate.

The Congress in Margate, like the Conservative Congress in Blackpool, showed that the Labourites and the Conservatives agree on the fundamental issues of foreign policy and that the main battle at the coming elections would center around problems of internal policy like wages, prices, profits, nationalization, etc. The Congresses showed that the Labourites and the Conservatives are both aware of the fact that the workers represent the main mass of the voters for whose support they must fight at the coming elections. As the Party in power, the Labourites were forced to make their promises to the working class as regards wages and improved conditions within realizable proportions, while the Conservatives had a better opportunity to make more boastful promises the achievement of which it is hard to talk about now, especially when Great Britain is faced with an extensive armaments program.

AUTHORITY OF UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY EXPANDED

THE events in Korea have given new life to the discussion of the ways and means to be used by the United Nations in combating aggression, or rather, in consolidating peace and international cooperation. In the course of these discussions, more and more attention is being paid to the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly or, to put it more accurately, to the distribution of duties and responsibilities between these two bodies in accomplishing the main aim of the Organization.

The special position of the five big powers (USA, USSR, Great Britain, France, China) gives this discussion its political substance. Otherwise, the entire matter would be reduced to a more or less technical level and would not attract so much attention in the world. The fact alone that the Security Council can, in case of immediate danger of war or if war has already broken out, make binding decisions (in contrast to the General Assembly which can only make proposals) would not give these discussions such great significance. A proposal to undertake military measures against an aggressor which is voted for unanimously, or with a majority, would certainly not have less effect than a binding decision of the Council.

The special position of the big powers in the UNO is expressed primarily in the fact that, according to the Charter, each decision of the Security Council must be voted for by seven members (of a total number of eleven), with the condition that all the five big powers also voted for the decision. This practically means that each one of the five big powers can prevent the adoption of any Security Council decision. The only exception to this rule are procedural decisions.

The position of the Soviet Union to the effect that the function of maintaining the peace is the exclusive task of the Security Council has, therefore, no other aim than to keep its privilege as a big power at any cost, or to extend it beyond the point provided for by the Charter.

In presenting their point of view, the Soviet representatives always insist pathetically on adhering to the letter of the Charter and respecting Law. Regardless of the fact that the Soviet Union's attitude toward other countries

(toward Yugoslavia, for example) is not in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Charter, however, its attitude toward the question of the veto is also not in harmony with the provisions of the Charter.

Shortly after the Security Council began working, the USSR and the other big powers concluded an agreement that abstention from voting by one big power would not be an obstacle in the way of considering a proposal legally adopted, if the necessary majority of seven had voted for it. This agreement had been applied in practice many times, although it is obvious that it is not in accordance with the Charter. Article 27 of the Charter explicitly requires that the five permanent members of the Council must vote for a decision, while abstaining from voting is clearly not the same thing as voting for a proposal.

The stand of the Soviet Government then, like its stand in the present discussions, is evidently based on reasons which have no connection with keeping the Charter sacred. Departing in one sense from a doubtlessly inflexible provision of the Charter has led to a transformation of the "rule of unanimity" to the "right of veto". Instead of the obligation of unanimity on the part of the permanent members, we have the right to obstruct a decision by a negative vote — the veto.

This has created a situation whereby one big power can stop a decision, should it wish to do so. On the other hand, it can allow a decision to be made while washing its hands of all moral responsibility for its adoption and implementation.

Simultaneously, the insistence of the Soviet Union on extending its veto right in the Security Council to the right of veto on all questions relating to the maintenance of peace in general does not issue from the desire to achieve joint responsibility and unanimous cooperation among the big powers. It is rather the result of a tendency to impose upon the entire Organization of the United Nations the obligation of stopping every action if it is not in accordance with the will of a big power, concretely, the Soviet Union.

However, changing the topic of discussion and talking about obedience to the letter of the Law is merely an attempt to evade political

FROM THE UNO

discussion of how the United Nations can fulfill its main task, the preservation of peace. In talking about this, the Soviet Union presents a simple formula to the effect that peace can be based only on the agreement of the big powers.

Fortunately, this formula is not an accurate one, for if it were, the Third World War would already have been in full swing. Even in San Francisco in 1945, the founders of the Charter were not so naive as to think that the relations among the big powers in the future would be replete with idyllic harmony and unanimity. The provision on the unanimity of the big powers in the Security Council was included in the Charter precisely because of mutual distrust as to the good intentions of the big powers. It was formulated at a time when the relations between the USSR, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other, had already shown that there was a whole series of fundamental points of disagreement in the post-war period.

The founders of the Charter, including the representatives of the USSR, introduced the provision on the unanimity of the big powers in the Security Council into the Charter precisely because they were fully aware of the necessity to settle misunderstandings and disputes peacefully. In this way, the big powers undertook the obligation to come to an understanding and to insure one another against abuses. In other words, each one of the big powers tried to insure itself against the application of forcible measures by special authorization of the Security Council, which a bloc made up of the remaining four powers could undertake.

Experience has shown, however, that at least one of the 1945 presumptions was not correct, that is, that all the states, and especially the big powers, would always try to settle all disputed questions within the scope of the United Nations, meaning that they would constantly be cooperating through the Security Council. The Soviet boycott of the Security Council this year showed that clearly.

It is obvious that the United Nations in such a situation, if they wish to fulfil their fundamental task — the maintenance of peace, must provide for measures which will make it possible to undertake action against aggression regardless of the ability or inability of the Security Council to play the role assigned to it by the Charter.

The experience of Korea has shown that it is an altogether improbable thing today that a war begun in any spot in the world will remain isolated for long. The conflict in Korea has further demonstrated that passive waiting for the five big powers to come to an understanding and undertake measures to stop the

war can only lead to a deterioration of the situation to such an extent that no action by the UN will be able to stop the spreading of war.

The alternatives facing the UN may be formulated in the following way: either to permit war to spread in case the big powers do not agree, or, to mobilize the authority of the UN by immediate discussion of the dispute before all UN members publicly, in front of the entire world.

The UN has chosen the second solution with the support of the great majority of members in the organization that the question of war or peace cannot be regarded merely as a question of agreement between the big powers, because if such an agreement should fall through that fact might involve the whole world in the horrors of a new world war.

The most recent decisions of the General Assembly have undoubtedly increased the responsibility and role of the Assembly. In the future, it will have a more important role in the preservation of peace than was foreseen in 1945 in San Francisco. However, this evolution in the Organization's method of work can only contribute to the consolidation of its authority. It is based on the active participation of all member-States in the struggle against aggressions.

The question comes up as to the extent to which the General Assembly could act effectively in case of a dispute among the big powers, or between a big power and a smaller state. Before answering this question, it is necessary to insert a word of caution to the effect that actually the only thing left after that is action by the General Assembly, unless the victim is to surrender to his fate peacefully. Regardless of that, however, the discussion of disputes in the General Assembly and the action of the great majority of the member-States represents such a moral and material force that any potential aggressor will keep it well in mind.

Actually, experience so far has shown that the activity of the United Nations, even after conflict had broken out, could force a big power, which was actively supporting aggression, to return to the table of the United Nations. Therefore, the theory that the decisions of the majority are not valid for the big powers has been shown up as inaccurate, and therein lies a guarantee for the effective functioning of the General Assembly of the United Nations in preventing aggression.

S. PRIMORAC

International Financing of Under-developed Countries

AMONG the various subjects considered at this year's session of the UNO General Assembly, the question of development of under-developed countries has been claiming the attention of the delegates, and, in this connection, the possibility of increased participation of the UNO and its specialized agencies in the financing of the project has also been a subject of study. This complex of questions has been a highlight also of the Fifth Regular Session of the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction, held in Paris during the first half of September of this year. Similarly, at the August meeting of the Economic-Social Council of the United Nations, the economically under-developed countries took advantage of the discussion concerning the maintenance of full employment⁽¹⁾ to underline the close relationship existing between the low degree of development of productive forces and insufficient employment (or hidden unemployment) which occurs and remains a constant phenomenon in such countries as their specific structural feature, independently from the rise and fall of unemployment caused by the movements of the economic cycles.

The increasing emphasis of this problem in UNO and its specialized agencies is certainly not due to chance. It is, on the one hand, the outcome of a comprehensible and justified desire and struggle of the masses of the people in the under-developed countries for a maximum growth of the pace of economic development, as reflected in the concretization of major capital investment projects, the rational exploitation of their productive resources and the tendency for the liquidation of technical backwardness, as a heritage of the imperialistic exploitation of such countries — a desire and struggle which inevitably arose in the present phase of world social development. It is the consequence, on the other hand, of the clear recognition of the fact by world public opinion that a proper development of the international economic and political cooperation stipulates the provision of full assistance and scope to under-developed countries, which would enable them, by fostering their national economy, to ensure a more dignified living standard for their populations, and to appear in international trade as equal partners. Apart from this, the complete upheaval in world economic relations caused by the uneven character of world economic development, which assumed particularly acute forms during and after the Second World War, has been imposing as an imperative, and still does so, the various efforts aiming at the establishment of a bearable degree of equilibrium through an accelerated development of the productive forces existing in under-developed countries.

There are two ways for the attainment of economic improvements in under-developed countries: with the aid of foreign credits, or without it. Its carrying out without foreign credits would involve the employment of native resources for the financing of the high level of capital investments necessary in

order to overcome the process as rapidly as possible. In a practical sense, this would require a limitation of individual consumption, which might retain a relative character in so far as there should ensue a simultaneous corresponding increase in the net national income, i. e. an increase in domestic production, so as to offset the higher utilisation of assets needed for capital projects. The limitation of individual consumption, however, may also be of an absolute character if the net national output should have retained the same volume or if it should have gone up, even if to a lesser extent, when compared with the increased outlays of capital. Considering that the given degree of development of the productive forces often precludes a sufficient stepping up of the net national income, considering, furthermore, that the monetary reserves of undeveloped countries are either too low or non-liquid (e. g. the sterling claims of the British colonies and dominions) as to secure the necessary increase of the social product through an export surplus—it clearly follows that the implementation of the investment programme in such cases inevitably affects the level of consumption in an economically undeveloped country, and might even lead to eventual upheavals in the latter's monetary stability.

Foreign financing of the investment programme, e. g. the relative contribution to the domestic efforts of a poorly developed country, may in some measure alleviate the difficulties faced by the present generations and spread part of the industrialisation burden over a later period, when the development attained in between by the productive forces will have exerted its positive influence on the final formation of the payments balance of the country in question. The only question which might be posed here concerns the terms on which foreign financing would be effected, terms which would on the one hand have to ensure the repayment of the credits advanced, and, on the other, would constitute a guarantee to the effect that the receipt of such assets would be in full accord with the political and economic interests of the receiving country.

The financing by international financial agencies indubitably presents considerable advantages as against financing by the national governments, and incomparable advantages over other forms of world capital movement. The advancing of aid by specialized international agencies — on principles laid down in the foundations of UNO — should constitute a simultaneous guarantee for the poorly developed countries that the financial aid would be extended in the spirit of true international cooperation, and with due respect for the economic independence and liberty of the receiving country. Such financing could, further, ensure the harmonious expansion of all economic branches and, thereby, avoid a parallel neglect of the one and the hypertrophy of the other branch of economic activity, which might arise if the economy of one country is not viewed as an entirety, and the financing conducted instead on the basis of selection of particular investment possibilities. In a practical

(1) National and International Measures for Full Employment, Report by a Group of Experts Appointed by the Secretary-General, Lake Success, December 1949.

sense, such selection might mean the deformation of the entire economic development of a poorly developed country and actually foil the final objective desired: the raising of the economy of the poorly developed country as a whole for the improvement of the living standard of its population and an augmentation of the volume of international commodity exchanges. This does not imply that the feature of "specific projects" does not arise in a far more overwhelming degree also in the financing by international organizations; it only means that the feature is not typical to this mode of financing and that it may be removed in the process of serious economic analysis of the over-all investments programme and by a proper appraisal of the future economic structure and the payments balance of the under-developed country.

The International Bank for Development and Reconstruction is for the time being a specialized agency of the United Nations devoted to international financing. Its activities to date in assisting the development of the productive forces of under-developed countries have not fulfilled all expectations, especially not in the initial phase of its operation. From the beginning of its operations (in 1947) until September 1950, the bank has granted a total of 965 million dollars in loans, of which only about 310 million dollars went to meet the needs of the under-developed countries (Brazil 90 millions, India 62.5 millions, Mexico 60.1 millions, Uruguay 33 millions, Turkey 16.4 millions, Chile 16 millions, Iraq 12.8 millions, El Salvador 12.5 millions, Colombia 5 millions, Yugoslavia — a timber loan of 2.7 million dollars), and over 400 million dollars including the 100 million dollar loan granted to Australia in August 1950. The bank's activity in this field has been concentrated on Latin America. The needs of the Middle and Near East, Africa, the under-developed areas of Europe — were almost neglected. Its policy was directed toward the financing of specific projects, and only the loan to Australia had been granted for the financing of the over-all economic development of that country. However, the bank's administration displays of late a greater understanding of the needs of under-developed countries, although it is very problematic as to whether the business principles so far applied, its organization and available assets would permit such essential expansion of the bank's activities which would suffice to meet at least the minimum requirements of the under-developed countries. In this connection, the question of reorganization of the bank's operations by means of an intensified enlisting of the national governments in the collection of assets, and enhanced participation by UNO in the distribution of such assets, has been raised with ever-increasing frequency recently. Proposals have even been advanced for the creation of a separate international institution (UNEDA — United Nations Economic Development Administration) to cope with the financing of economically under-developed countries in such cases where the procurement of foreign loans from other sources proves impossible. Regardless of the final form to be adopted for the extension of economic assistance to under-developed countries, this question has clearly assumed central importance in the present international happenings, which makes an intensified interest and enlistment of the international community in this field inevitable.

Dragoslav AVRAMOVIĆ

FRANCE AND THE INTEGRATION OF WESTERN GERMANY

THE tendency toward the economic merging of Western Europe into a unified economy with a unified market has particularly come to the fore towards the end of 1948 in the plans set up by the representatives of the European Economic Administration (EEA) and of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). By their political substance, these plans were designed to transform Western Europe into a unified economic and military-political force, which, under the conditions of a policy of blocs, would strengthen the Western positions in the cold war with USSR.

The establishment of a united Western Europe, which is hindered by very powerful and mutually conflicting interests of the Western countries, is influenced not only by active American efforts but also by the policy of the USSR which has led to a mitigation and suppression of West European contradictions, and to the reinforcement of the need for united resistance to that policy. For a united Western Europe is possible only as long as there exists an integrated Eastern Europe wherein the USSR holds all the key positions. This means that the USSR policy in Eastern Europe, as well as its policy on the world plane, is the direct cause of the strengthening of reactionary forces in Western Europe.

Among all the countries of Western Europe the most convincing example in that direction is provided by the France of today. And this is by no means accidental. From a political standpoint, France represents the pith and marrow of Western Europe. A solution of the question of Western Europe is impossible without the participation of France. For that reason the U. S. efforts for the creation of a unified Western Europe have mainly centred, in their initial phase, on the salvage and consolidation of the positions of the French ruling circles.

There was no need for the Americans to subdue the French capitalists. What is more, to French banks and industrialists who are closely attached to American monopolies through various links they extended economic and political assistance to enable France, despite her weakening after the Second World War, to retain, even if partly, her pre-war positions.

Precisely that was the determining factor of France's attitude towards the plans for the integration of Western Europe. Whilst the British capital clashed with the American in different parts of the world, the French capitalists found in their reliance and dependence on American capital not only the necessary concrete help for the strengthening of their positions inside France, and for solving the problem of retaining power, but also a means for the stabilisation of their economic and political positions abroad, which had been shaken during and after the Second World War.

It came to close French-U. S. A. cooperation, first under the Marshall Plan, and then in all the other bodies as well, whose aim was the integration of Western Europe. Whereas Great Britain, protecting above all else her imperial interest and defending herself from American capital, enters with great re-

luctance into certain American combinations aiming at the economic integration of Western Europe, France is becoming almost the principal exponent of American policy in Western Europe.

This is a fact of indubitable magnitude in the present political situation and it enables the U. S. A. to pursue effectively its political and military strategy. Coupled with this is the fact that American policy has yielded enough positive results in the present phase of West-European development. Out of the over-all American aid to foreign countries, which, in 1949, amounted to some six billion dollars, almost 70 per cent. were allocated to Western Europe. The outcome has been a substantial increase in industrial production in the main West European countries. In the first quarter of 1950, the volume of industrial production exceeded by 23 per cent. the pre-war level, and a 22 per cent. increase on the pre-war figure was recorded in the second quarter of this year. According to official statements, the dollar deficit has declined and there has been an increase in gold reserves. American sources state that this year has also seen a drop in American exports to the countries of Western Europe, and an increase in the latter's shipments to U. S. A.

France has drawn indubitable benefits from this consolidation of Western Europe's economic situation. Only, both for France and for Western Europe, the benefits are of a passing nature. The armaments race, the burden of which will be borne only in part by the U. S. while the balance, probably the major portion, by the other West European states, will eliminate the benefits experienced by the nations of Western Europe from such consolidation. The appropriation for armaments in the French 1951 budget is estimated at 650,000 million francs, which is more than half of all the expenditure for civilian purposes. Added to this is the jump in the world raw material prices, which has occurred since the outbreak of the war in Korea, and which has again led to inflationary tendencies in France.

This instability in Western European economic consolidation stems from the fact that Western European economy is not gaining in strength normally, under its own power, but at the expense and on account of the U. S. A., and because it is mainly dependent on the American market in the matter of raw materials.

Nor is to be overlooked the fact that the U. S. A. even though it is advancing frontally in connection with its plans for the integration of Western European economy, nevertheless does not adopt an identical attitude towards all the West European countries. In the first phase of their economic intervention, the Americans have principally endeavoured to save the positions of the bourgeoisie in France, it is to be said that there are still many reasons for the continuation of such support. However, the U. S. A. is actually far more interested in the strengthening of the West German economic potential. In the first place, because, due to the amalgamation of American and German monopolies, the U. S. A. is interested that Germany should regain her erstwhile position, and secondly, because, within the framework of American military strategy, Western Germany, with her vast industrial and manpower potential, represents a factor

of greater significance than France. This fact alone renders problematic the entire policy being pursued today by France.

It is understandable that France should be trying to paralyze this by taking the initiative for the creation of the so-called higher form of European integration, whose first contour is the Schuman Plan for the merging of the French and West German coal and steel industries. By means of these and similar agreements, France is endeavouring to exploit her present political positions in a way which would secure for her predominance in such a future unified Western Europe. But such agreements can be sustained only for the duration of the cold war, which is forcing the U. S. to grant concessions to France at the expense of Germany. For the German economic potential is stronger than the French, and, also, labour in Western Germany is cheaper than it is in France, all of which casts a problematic light on the "predominance" which France strives to secure for herself. On the other hand, the implementation of the Schuman integration plans spells for the French working class a lowering of the living standard. For only in this fashion would the French capitalists be able to endure German competition to some extent at least.

Henceforth, the position of France in the united Europe of the future could scarcely be in accord with the desires of the French ruling circles. This position will change subject to the developments of the cold war and of the international situation in general, to the speed and the degree of rehabilitation of Germany and the development of the internal situation in France herself.

Z. R.



Djordje ANDREJEVICH-KUN: SPANISH PATRIOTS BEING EXECUTED BY THE FASCISTS (Woodcut)

LIFE IN SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

Voters' Assemblies - An Expression of Direct Democracy

FROM the very first days of its existence, popular democracy in Yugoslavia has been such that the people have been able to take a direct part in government. It can even be said that the forms of this democracy were the first forms of popular democracy in Yugoslavia in which the National Liberation Committees, which emerged at the beginning of the insurrection in 1941, were organs elected and recalled directly by the people at their meetings and authorized by them to carry on the work of government in the name of the people. The meetings at which the people elected organs of government, called Voters' Assemblies or meetings of voters, did not meet only for the purpose of election of the National Liberation Committees but also to discuss all problems of town and country and to adopt general and binding decisions.

The development of people's government in Yugoslavia during the war and after the war brought with it a whole series of new and advanced forms through which the people were to take part in the running of the government in everyday life. The most explicit of such forms are the workers' councils by which the workers manage the state economic enterprises; then there are the Citizens' Councils, through which the citizens take increasingly direct part in the implementation of the work of state administration. However, the "voters' assemblies" have not lost their great importance in the system of popular democracy. They have remained the most explicit form of direct popular democracy, if we understand direct democracy to have the meaning it has today in all progressive science on the state, that is, as a form through which the people take direct part in the government without any delegates. The voters' assemblies as such, a form of direct popular democracy, were given legal status in the General Law on People's Committees, Article 98-102. The Law lays down the following fundamental principles as regards the voters' assemblies:

- 1) Voters' assemblies are competent to discuss questions which are related either to the affairs of the locality or town and problems from the competence of higher people's committees and other state organs. They are therefore organs of direct popular

- control over the work of all organs of government;
- 2) All voters or electoral units, have the right to take part in the voters' assemblies, to put forward proposals and to vote;
- 3) The voters' assemblies are regularly held every two months. A special voters' assembly can be called by the People's Committee on its own initiative or upon demand by one fifth of the voters;
- 4) The Committee member elected in the respective electoral unit renders account to the voters' assembly and, upon demand by the voters, the People's Committee must also render account of all its work to it;
- 5) At each one of its current sessions, the People's Committee must discuss and make decisions on the conclusions reached by the voters' assemblies, and if they relate to higher organs, it must submit them to the higher organs for consideration. If the People's Committee does not adopt the conclusions of the voters' assembly, it must inform the Plenum of the higher People's Committee of this and the latter will then make a decision on this.

The General Law on People's Committees, as we see, laid down only the fundamental principle for the functioning of the voters' assemblies. On the basis of this, the various Republics have the duty of adopting their own Laws on voters' assemblies elaborating this material which is of tremendous principled importance for the further work of the people's government. These laws are now in preparation.

Although the legislative material on the voters' assemblies has not yet been elaborated, they nevertheless have a long tradition and a great deal of experience behind them in our country. The assemblies of voters are, so to speak, a daily phenomenon in our villages and towns, especially in those regions where our people's government developed during the war. In 1949, there were in Yugoslavia 28,000 voters' assemblies. In Bosnia, for instance, there were over 4,000 in which almost a million voters took part. At their meetings, the voters discuss almost all questions relating to the work of the People's Committees. For example, at the voters' assemblies in Zemun during the months of September and October, 121 questions were brought up in connection with public works, 414 questions regarding supplies, 44 questions related to the housing problem, 23 question having to do with health service, etc. The Local People's Committees have the duty of discussing certain problems which effect all citizens at the voters'

assemblies. The Decree on the State Grain Purchase provides that the assessments of grain be brought out at the voters' assemblies so that the latter can come to a decision regarding their correctness. This is also provided for in regard to the sowing plan, tax assessments, etc. The Law on the Recall of People's Deputies gives the Voters' Assemblies the right of initiative in recalling their representatives.

Although we can freely state that the Assemblies of Voters are the oldest institution of our popular democracy, and although they have a long tradition behind them and are developing more and more, we still cannot claim that they have advanced sufficiently and that they have reached that level which is necessary in a system of popular democracy. Standing in the way of the development of Voters' Assemblies are bureaucratic tendencies specially in the District, Town and Local People's Committees. Various kinds of bureaucratic officials in these People's Committees are endeavoring to wrest themselves from the control of the people and that is why the first thing they do is try to neglect the Assemblies of Voters. For that reason, the fight against bureaucracy is at the same time a fight for all forms of participation by the people in the administration, and particularly a fight for the further development and consolidation of the Voters' Assemblies.

Perceiving all the shortcomings and obstacles in the way of development of the Voters' Assemblies, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has put it to its local organization to develop the participation of the people in the administration and their criticism of the organs of state administration. The local branches of the Communist Party must organize this criticism through the Voters' Assemblies and fight to have the People's Committees do what the people demand in their criticism. This political line of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has already been reflected in the consolidation of the role and importance of Voters' Assemblies. They are developing as the most explicit form of direct democracy in the system of popular government in Yugoslavia.

Dr. Leon GERSHKOVICH

A LETTER FROM USA

On the Eve of Elections to the Congress

OWING to the international situation and the war in Korea, the recess of Congress was much delayed this year, and the election campaign has started later than usual. Regardless of this belated start, however, far greater interest centres on the forthcoming elections than would be normally warranted in an "off-year", viz. a year in which only the elections to the House of Representatives and to a third of the Senate take place, and not the Presidential elections.

The election struggle here usually revolves around domestic issues. The activities of the Congress in the election year are, therefore, carefully adjusted to the needs of the electioneering campaign. The party in power tends to push through Congress as many of its programmatic measures as possible. But the Democrats this time have no particular cause to pride themselves on the work of the last Congress, the 81st in American history. None of the more important measures which figured in their election schedule in 1948 have been adopted by the Congress. The abolition of the anti-labour legislation, the Brannan plan on farming subsidies, the programme for the protection of civic rights, the law on Federal aid to education and other similar measures were shipwrecked in Congress under the blows of the Republicans, united with the reactionary Democratic fraction, especially those from the semi-feudal South. The only substantial success recorded by the Government was in the improved system of social insurance. The reactionary forces have succeeded, in spite of Truman's veto, in having the Congress adopt, with an enormous majority, the MacCarran anti-Communist law. This law would never have been adopted if it had not been for the increasingly aggressive policy of the Soviet Union throughout the world, and for the Cominformist line of the U. S. Communist Party.

In contrast to former times, when victory in the elections used to be conditioned by internal issues, the latter have been relegated to a secondary role today. The international situation, and especially the war in Korea, have caused international problems to come to the forefront.

It already became clear early this year that the fight against

world communism would form the principal slogan in the elections. In Congress, the Republicans, representing big business and extreme reaction, as early as January launched their attack on the Government. Especially strong was the campaign of Senator MacCarthy against the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who was accused of having admitted communists and fellow-travellers to leading posts in the State Department. In the sphere of international policy, the Republican attacks have been focussed on Truman and Acheson, who were accused of responsibility for the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and causing the loss of the most valuable U. S. positions there by trying to appease communism in Asia. This campaign reached its climax with Truman's rejection of the demand put forward by military circles for intervention in Formosa.

The Korean conflict has led to changes in the electioneering campaign. The Republicans, whose campaign was built on the accusation that the Democrats had been pursuing a too soft and yielding policy in Asia, were suddenly faced by the fact that it was precisely the Democrats' own government which had adopted such measures in Korea which far exceeded anything the Republicans had been asking up to then.

Faced with this situation, they shifted the whole blame for the war to mistakes committed by the Government. The latter was especially exposed to censure on account of the premature withdrawal of U. S. troops from Korea, in 1948, and because of certain statements by Democratic politicians to the effect that Korea did not belong to the U. S. defense perimeter. In addition to Acheson himself, the Minister of National Defense, Louis Johnson, was also the main target of Republican attack. The campaign produced such tension and mass excitement that even Democratic candidates were prompted to exert pressure on Truman to fire Acheson and Johnson. Truman at first stubbornly refused, but when Acheson and Johnson clashed the latter had to resign. General Marshall's appointment in the place of Johnson was a rather sound tactical move. Marshall's popularity and the confidence inspired by him as a soldier among the American masses are very great, and the linking of his name with Truman's government has greatly benefitted the Democratic party.

Defending themselves from the charges of yielding to USSR in the international sphere, the Democrats carefully combed the Congressional Record and issued a documented publication proving their

merit in the adoption of a series of measures, in the face of tenacious Republican opposition—mainly designed to resist the USSR on a world scale. A large group of Republicans, mostly isolationists from the Middle-West, was opposed to the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, the Military Aid Programme, etc. Thanks to the Republicans, the bill on the assistance to South Korea was rejected at its first reading in the House of Representatives early this year. Accordingly, could the USSR not be able to draw the conclusion that the U. S. would not send its troops to Korea when it was reluctant to send even dollars there?, asked the Democrats.

At all events, the successes in Korea have improved the Democrats' position and the election results will largely depend on the developments in the war situation on the very eve of the elections.

The exclusive contestants in the November elections will be the Democrats and the Republicans. The Progressive Party will make a bid in fifteen states, although practically with no prospects of success. Even the re-election of the party's only present Congressman, Marcantonio, is problematic. After the recent split and Wallace's exit, the party no longer represents a serious political force.

The mainstay of the Republicans lies in the conservative farming districts and petty-bourgeois elements in minor cities, especially in the Middle-West and North-East (New England). By being a party of big capital, it naturally follows that most of its election funds accrue from the contributions of bankers and industrialists. The Democrats are strongest in industrial states and in the traditional "Solid South". Their mighty allies are the large labour unions, especially the CIO, whose political action committees actively work for Democratic candidates. The powerful and wealthy labour unions represent an important source of financial assets for the election campaign of the Democrats. The Democrats expect to corner this time most of the votes which had been cast for Wallace before.

In order to achieve a majority in the Congress, the Republicans would require to wrest from the Democrats 47 seats in the House of Representatives and 7 seats in the Senate. Will they succeed in this? It is a hard question to answer. The forecasting of election results in U. S. is a very thankless task, as borne out by the last elections, in 1948, which gave Truman a resounding victory in spite of all the prognoses having been against him.

Ray WILSON

A LETTER FROM ITALY

Economic and Financial Situation in Italy

THE criticism of the Italian government's economic and financial policy, which was given a few days ago by Mr. Leon Dayton, the chief of the American Mission for the Marshall Plan in Rome, at a press conference, represents to-day the centre of all the political actions in the Italian capital. First of all, this criticism has come unexpectedly as can be seen from the first answer, which was given by the semi-official Italian ANSA agency, in the following words: "In the political circles of Rome great astonishment is being expressed concerning the criticism of Mr. Dayton, for, not only in the opinion of the Italian Government, it is in contradiction with the public acknowledgments, which the former chief of the American economic mission in Italy. Mr. Zellerbach, has paid to Italy's efforts at recovery within the framework of the Marshall Plan".

This astonishment in the Roman circles was really justified, because the tone of Mr. Dayton's statement was very enigmatic: "... the present economic and financial policy in Italy is pushing her economy into ruin, there exists very little hope that with the additional 200 million dollars, which Italy has yet to receive before the end of the Marshall Plan, she will succeed to compensate what her economy has lost through the liquidation of her metal industry and through the steady increase of unemployment".

There is no doubt, for all those who know the economic conditions in Italy, that this criticism is basically true and irrefutable and that it comes as a logical consequence of the development of international situation. The aid, which the United States is extending to the Western European countries within the framework of the Marshall Plan, has been considerably reduced this year, while the operative program for its application has been essentially changed at the time when the British pound was devalued.

Instead of being used for the achievement of budgetary stability and for the balancing of their large expenditures, as was at first conceived, all the European countries, by the decision of OEEC, are using the greater part of this aid primarily for new armaments and for investments in heavy industry. Meanwhile, Italy is the only country in Western Europe, which has not

devalued her national currency. Moreover, the clauses of the peace treaty forbidding the production of war materials have helped her to utilise all the aid, received through the Marshall Plan, exclusively for balancing her budgetary expenditures. This economic policy of maintaining the value of the Lira is an expressly deflationary policy pursued by Mr. Pella, the Minister of the State Treasury, who, it is said, is the right hand man of Mr. Luigi Einaudi, the President of the Italian Republic, who is one of the most prominent of the Italian liberals in the sphere of economics.

The defence of the Lira, which represents the main pillar of the present policy of the sixth cabinet of Prime Minister de Gasperi, imposes in the meantime heavy sacrifices on the Italian economy. From the state resources no investments can be made, because there are no funds. The help from America is sufficient only for the covering of regular expenditures of the Italian State. From the start of the Marshall Plan up to this day Italy has received something over 700 million dollars in goods, which were used to satisfy the needs of the population in foodstuffs, textiles and for reconstruction of the most critical communications, schools and hospitals. Nothing was left for industrialisation.

Such a situation brought about a destructive policy of liquidation, first of the Italian metallurgical and heavy industry, and afterwards of some branches of light industry. From the day the Marshall Plan was put into operation until today, according to incomplete data, there were liquidated over 1,000 large industrial plants, which caused the bankruptcy of a whole chain of smaller industrial enterprises and of big commercial and retail firms. The factories were closed one after the other, and the number of unemployed is constantly increasing.

There is no doubt that United States interest in the Italian economy is mostly centered on the question of full capacity utilisation of the heavy industry, and in the possibility of its increase and expansion, and secondly, as an important political question, also in the problem of unemployment. For that reason Mr. Dayton proposes "a bolder economic policy of investments, which will not stop even at the possibility of inflation". He knows, of course, that there are no available reserves in the budget for new investments and he, therefore, quite openly proposes to the Government to devalue the Lira; to abandon the policy of maintaining its purchasing power and in this way to achieve the full utilisation of industrial

capacity of Italy in the collective efforts for the armament of the Atlantic Pact countries.

This whole case of Dayton's criticisms would not perhaps represent such a central question in the Italian politics, if it had not revealed a new contradiction between the Italian State, a beneficiary of Marshall Plan, and the United States, which is extending that aid. There is no doubt that the increase of production can help the Italian economy, but if it must result in budget deficits, and consequently in the inflation of the Lira, which means transferring the burden of investments on to the back of the small man-the worker, under conditions in which the means of production do not belong to the workers, nor a worker's or a people's state, than it is clear that such a path can be of advantage only to those who wish to exploit the efforts for the reinforcement of the armaments of one of the blocs.

In the governmental political circles Dayton's criticism was a blow for all those who, together with Minister Pella, for three years promulgated the policy of defence of the Lira. To desert that policy, now would mean the fall of the Government. This possibility is especially certain because in the circles of the Christian Democratic party there are many, who, like the Minister of Interior Affairs, Scelba, in alliance with the Republican Minister of War, Pacciardi, consider that the question of the future military defence (in fact of the present armaments) can be solved exclusively through the devaluation of the Lira, and through the increase of production with special emphasis on investment in the means of production which should be found even at the expense of general increase of deficits.

From all the foregoing factors the prevailing opinion in Rome is that Dayton's criticism represents the creation of a most serious economic and political crisis.

B. RAFAJLOVIC

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ИЗЛЕГУВА МЕСЕЧНО

ЦЕНА 10 С

11 октомври — најголемиот празник на македонскиот народ

САМО ЗА ЧЕТИРИ ДЕНА

распишаната сума за вториот
нареден земјан беше натпревна

Во првата половина од септември народите од Југославија одбележија уште една круна победа: вториот нареден земјан беше исплатен и платен, натпревна. Рокот на запитувањето беше од првиот до двесте септември, меѓутоа уште од четвртиот ден на уписот на, а сèкој ден потаму постојано растеше дури по осумдесетот ден од уписот која уписот беше првкратен без заминување 5,418,958,000 динари.

Запитувањето на вториот нареден земјан во такв краток време, е редок пример на успех во запитувањето на внатрешните земји по светот.

И првиот нареден земјан од 1948 година беше исплатен и натпревна за кратко време. Меѓутоа тем пошто на уписот на овој нареден земјан беше многу побрзо и брзојот на запитувањето далеку побрзо. Така првиот нареден земјан од три и пол милијарди динари беше извршен за тридесет дена, а истата сума за вториот нареден земјан беше исплатена за пет дена.

Успешното запитување на вториот нареден земјан е резултат на патристичката свест на нашите трудејници кои преку вториот нареден земјан свикаа да ја помогнат и забават социјалистичката и граѓанска својата земја. Преку уписот во вториот нареден земјан тие го изразија своето единство и увереноста во изградбата на социјалистичко соопствено сити. Понатаму од првиот нареден земјан се гледа од најголемиот труд до изградбата сè до Југославија во изградбата на една објект и во борбата за независност на нашето сопствено единство.

Победата во вториот нареден земјан е постигната со иста еднодушност со која трудејниците работат на изградбата на земјата. Успехот во вториот нареден земјан ги побди да ги даде свој придонес кон изградбата на социјалистичката држава за успехот во вториот нареден земјан.

Како и во другите републики, и во Македонија во вториот нареден земјан без заминување сума, уште од првиот ден на уписот, кои работниците од своите смети и трудејниците од Охрид уште во раните утрински часови почнаа да запитуваат првиот земјан, ова се некои од примерите кои го докажуваат дека македонците не само по својата свест, така и по брзојот на запитувањето. Во Охрид, на пример, целокупната сума нареден земјан која се објави тридесетот беше тапачена до осум часот наутро, а во најблиската два дена беше натпревна со 65 ст. сто. Објектите тие истражуваа свој работен колектив од фабриците и агрегатиранијата и не се свески. Во Скопје, Струмица и Брод објектите на целосното население сити за четврти ден од уписот, а во Штип објектите збавуваа беше натпревна за пет дена.

Она што особено го карактеризира е единството на нашиот македонски народ и оживот на населението од потпорајните држави. Сèкој неми селан од нашите советски реонити не ја изврши објектата за упис на земјот. Тие им дадоа убедлив одговор на „добродетелите“ осудени од империјалистичката Јава, Албанија и Бугарија. Во село Семенска, на пример, што се наоѓа на троната Југославија — Бугарија — Грција во првите четири дена беа запитува 150,000 динари првкратен земјан, а нискоко потоа кој

(Продолжува на 7 стр.)

11 октомври е ден кога македонскиот народ под раководството на Коммунистичката партија на Југославија и другарот Тито и се придружи на оружената борба на сите народи од Југославија против фашистичките окупатори и нивните сатлоти. Од таа борба за прв пат во својата многувеквиона историја тој излезе со своја држава — НР Македонија, како рамнотежен член на социјалистичка Југославија.

Во историјата на македонскиот народ има многу светли дати за кои сèкој македонски патриот со гордост се сеќава. Тој го има Илинден, кога 1903 година се дига на оружано востание против турското робство и ја создаде својата Крушевска република, во која што сите македонци од тој врај добија свој права.

Македонскиот народ со векови се бореше против туѓинските завојувачи, за своје национално ослободување и подобна живот. Но многу тешко не го постигна тоа, ниту без давајќи скани жртви и пролијајќи реки од крв. Дури во нова Југославија македонскиот народ го остварува она за што со векови соопствено добит можност за својот национален живот. Народна Република Македонија, како рамнотежен член на социјалистичка Југославија претставува остварување баш на сите жртви и борби на македонскиот народ.

Во историјата на македонскиот народ, не Петров и др. И не само тоа; Народна Република Македонија претставува и натпревна ја тие идеали, бидејќи најголемиот ден од македонскиот народ што живее во Народна Македонија од Народно-ослободителната војна не само што излезе национално ослободен, туку и со власт во свои раце, и по тој начин добит можност за својот национален живот. Народна Република Македонија од Народно-ослободителната војна не само што излезе национално ослободен, туку и со власт во свои раце, и по тој начин добит можност за својот национален живот. Поради тоа 11 октомври е празник на целиот македонски народ, како на неговиот најголем.

(Продолжува на 3 стр.)

Испитувањето на самото место покажаа дека обвинејата на информбировците против Југославија се чудовишна лага и дека Југословените се во право да ја браќат својата независност

Испитувањето Француски, американски и Британски јавни работници Јан Касу, Џон Роги и Колин Зилијакс сојузница заедничка изјава во која го изнесоа своето мислење за проблемот на мирот и односите меѓу подметите сили. Сметале дека несреќно е во конфликтот меѓу Советскиот Сојуз и Југославија и главно прашање за решение на мирот по светот, тие најголем дел од својата изјава му посветила на тој проблем.

Напоменувајќи дека сите тројца, независно еден од друг, ја посетиле Југославија после избувнувањето на конфликтот меѓу СССР и Југославија и таму добиле јасна претстава за целиот спор. Касу, Роги и Зилијакс изјавуваат дека советско-Југословенскиот конфликт е природно резултат на тоа што евралева во битието на проблемот за мир. Тие сметаат дека е јавноа должност, бидејќи ниту големите учесници во борбата за мир, сèкој во својата земја и во меѓународни размери, јавно да споредат својата борба за мир, ако се сака тат да биде крунисана со успех, би морале да ги уште фактите што се одвиваат на југословенско-советскиот конфликт и оттука да извлечат соодветни политички заклучоци.

„Прекрст“ се вели во изјавата дека и дека Југославија е држава која уштево комунистичка

та партија преку Народниот фронт се ширка својот и преку јавни работници, тај изјавува социјализам и ја припишува на марксизмот „дигмизмот“. Идустријата е наивно глумивање, во земјоделството го дејствувачица во јавно побрзо од што во другите социјалистички држави.

Зедничка изјава на Жан Касу, Џон Роги и Колин Зилијакс за проблемот на мирот и односите меѓу подметите сили

држави, Петградити, јави се испитуваа наспроти гласајќи нивна што му беше наредено со советско-комунистичкиот бојкот.

Во меѓународната политика југо словенската адала е спротивставена на политиката на блокот и на политиката на Советскиот Сојуз на Обединетите нации, особено на припадните на елиминација, неметалите во внатрешните припадни на другите земји и меѓународно решение на сите спорови. Југословенската влада не презема ниту по лични ниту воени обврски, ниту на макар која запалител, сила и даде економски коалиции. Таа постои независна политика во обединетите нации, поднесувајќи често свои сопствени предлози.

рејскиот народ за да ја прошират својата хеменија. Секому денеска му е јасно дека југословенската војна е жестоко удар на делото на мирот во светот, токму поради тоа оти служат на туѓи хеменистички интереси.

1. Југославија е државин и по правата за право на својот народ на самоуправување, против мешање во внатрешните работи на независните држави. Гритувајќи од тоа гласите, тоа се разбира има сопствени судира, адротите и историски узрени семејни на дигности народи да бидат слободни и независни. Оваа социјалистичка Југославија на два марафта и политичка поддршка за уштеветите народи, ако нивната орба води кој стварно ослободување и стварна независност. Тоа се случува и за југословенскиот народ. Фактот е дека Југославија во својата меѓународна политичка активност секојкој го по државите припадни на југословенската држава, не само што се случува и за тоа сити, без мислење од евралејските сили, да избира своја влада и начин на животот. Најголем, тоа во Каса не се случува. Тоа земја стапа објект на борбата на евралејските сили, а борба за првкратен во светот.

2. Сметаме и дека по таквотот политичкиот прашање за мирот во светот, кој е неможено одделно да се решава. Оное што ја носат одговорност за војната во Југославија, за изјата дека таква војна доброе ќе го закрие светскиот мир, дека ќе ги поттисне сите сили на агресивната, дека ќе ја забави војната меѓина на големите сили и дека сесреќа ќе ги закрие сите меѓународни општествени. Така и се случува. Фактот дека тие започнуваат тат тријата токму денеска во тој ден југословенскиот народи дека не им е многу до светскиот мир, а уште помалку до слободата, независноста и обединувањето на југословенскиот народ.

Во продолжение на изјавата се осудува советското раководство спрема Југославија и се вели дека шефовите на Комунистичката партија на СССР, кои истовремено се инфими на советската влада, не сака што претпостават на тоа дека Комунистичката партија на Југославија треба да го уште својот мислење, туку се обидуваат она барање да го поддржуваат и со сите средства, во прв ред со економска блокада. Десетиници претвара на истражувањето одлучи, откажување на автосорите за претпоставка и сојуз и се официјална пропаганда преку сите радио-станици на Информбиро, кои го припаднуваат југословенскиот народ да ја обори својата влада. Притоа комунистички партијата го одобрива она барање како и металите употребени со нив да се поттичаат Југославија да се поттичаат.

„Комунистичката пропаганда особено е гласна поради тоа што постојано повторува дека Југославија постојано политичка играчка и дека баш на англоамериканскиот империјализам, дека прима оружје и офицери од Запад, дека

Југословенските разведователи се надеваат дека ќе можат напорно да ја соопштаат својата политичка поддршка на народот и вредноста на националните кадри и на богатството на својата земја.

Во продолжение на изјавата се осудува советското раководство спрема Југославија и се вели дека шефовите на Комунистичката партија на СССР, кои истовремено се инфими на советската влада, не сака што претпостават на тоа дека Комунистичката партија на Југославија треба да го уште својот мислење, туку се обидуваат она барање да го поддржуваат и со сите средства, во прв ред со економска блокада. Десетиници претвара на истражувањето одлучи, откажување на автосорите за претпоставка и сојуз и се официјална пропаганда преку сите радио-станици на Информбиро, кои го припаднуваат југословенскиот народ да ја обори својата влада. Притоа комунистички партијата го одобрива она барање како и металите употребени со нив да се поттичаат Југославија да се поттичаат.

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ВО ОВОЈ БРОЈ:
— 11 октомври — најголемиот празник на македонскиот народ.
— Македонци — Народни херои на Југославија.
— Изјава од Едвард Кардел за војната во Кореја.
— Изјава од Жан Касу, Џон Роги и Колин Зилијакс.
— Спорт

Изјава од министерот за надворешни работи Едвард Кардел за војната во Кореја

нако го изјата на странтин патна, а неговата земја на војно разоружување. Оношто е дека југословенскиот народ на збавно време и во конзервативни услови на кои се лага би требало да бара други припадни во борбата за својата независност и обединување, дејствувачи да се претвора неговата борба во инструмент на туѓа хеменистичка политика. Единствено со тоа тој би ја изградил морално политички неможна странската интервенција во Кореја и поново запитување на мирот. Наспроти тоа, југословенскиот народ е френ на патот кој — како што рече другарот Тито — не води кон неговата независност, а жртвите што тој ги дава денеска не се жртви за неговите интереси. Нешто порече, војната во Кореја не само што го заробува светскиот мир, туку ги доведува во опасност дури и оние придобивки што југословенскиот народ веќе доста ги изградил. Уште едни се поттичаат дека раководството на евралејските сили, а не само југословенскиот народ, да му нанесат несреќа на својот народ и на движењето на чие чело стои. Мисам да се рече дека југословенскиот народ сета е побрзоко за стварна независност и обединување, но што беше пред септавната војна?



Едвард Кардел

народите маси и овдеа, како и во многу други делови од светот, се злоупотреби за цели на туѓа империјалистичка политика што, се крие под лажни приказни за помош на југословенскиот народ во борбата за неговата независност. И токму затоа југословенската влада на севернојугословенскиот народ, како стварно ослободување на југословенскиот народ.

4. Народите на Југославија не можат а да не ги споредуваат наставите околу Кореја со фактот што ние третата година беспрестано се војат од страна на информбировските наводи чие чело со владата на СССР, беша агресивна акција против социјалистичка Југославија токму поради тоа што нејзиниот граѓански народ го брани своето право сам да решава на својата земја.

Оваа агресивна политика против социјалистичка Југославија набуѓајќи говори и за агресивната сити тина на политиката на нејзините организатори во другите делови од светот. Не може да има никаков сомнение дека оној што води агресивна, хеменистичка и империјалистичка политика спрема социјалистичка Југославија, не може да вози во другите делови од светот никаква, т. е. мирољубива, демократска, социјалистичка политика на истинска рамнотежност и братство на сите народи. Политиката на информбировските агенси веќе одам на не одговара повеќе на интересите на чешинскиот народот и затоа на агресивна ишта на сите оние прогресивни и ослободувачи движења што стануваат нејзини инструменти. Патада нивни сепатија прева за нивнаа вредност кој мирот и за агресивноста на други не ќе може да го свие и нивниот ден од одговорност за војната во Кореја и запитувањето на мирот во светот асошито.

5. Оноштодеа е спрема тоа дека народите на Југославија не можат да се социјализираат со таква политика што е упатена против интересите на светскиот мир, а во нив време му нанесува нешто штета и несреќа на југословенскиот народ. Покрај тоа, тие не можат да испуштаат правата дека социјалната војна во Кореја во крајна линија е последица од справското мешање во внатрешните работи на Кореја и фактичката поделба на таа земја во две интересни сфери. Во саква со таквите факти владата на ФИРП

(Продолжува на 6 стр.)

Мирче Ацев

Кузман Јосифовски -- Питу

Загоя и македонскиот народ за вечни времиња ќе го сочува спомениот за своите првоборци и херои Мирче и Страшо и за нивната јуничка смрт.

Во летото 1943 година се формира повторно кумановскиот одред, за негов командант дојде Карпуш. Подоцна одредот прерасна во баталјон. Негов командант пак беше Карпуш, Карпуш го сакаа сите негови борци. Тој беше бестрашен борец со вонредно богат опит за партизанско војување, Карпуш го сакаше и народот во Кумановско. Тој го бранеше од зулумите и грабежите на окупаторот.

А од Карпулу ум немаше окупа-
торски, Карпулу со својите борци у-
чествуваа во изградба на железни-
це, мостови, железници, железни
патежи, железни станици и војни објекти.
И Карпулу загина така како што
и натаму бестрашно борбата. Во бо-
рбата беа Билчака која бугарските по-
лиции беа осведени едни неприја-
телски зрно му го признаа грлото
на малиот командант, наведиот
во првата борбата ливчија над ра-
спелитег менофора.

Во своите десетина на скупштината во Скопје, Милош Ѓеѓевиќ беше пасивен, а не поддржана на највисоко 14.000. Ѓеѓевиќ е еден од оние што ги сфатиле слича првите десетизациски групи во Македонија и го прифатиле идеалот за борба со оружје против комунизмот. Во таа своја работа Ѓеѓевиќ на рачеше на стрелицата бугарскиот политички режим, а не поддржана на странските македонски работници. Ѓеѓевиќ и Орце не работат не прозборува за својата работа и за оние што ја работат зашто со него. Озверните фашистички ладаци со невидени мајки го умирават бојното тело на Ѓеѓевиќа во пролетта 1942 година и го фрлаат од највисокото кат на

И вторият паролот керо: од
којте Пингва Диого е сак: од
којте бидно и аристок семејно
ексно по набавиот извјат: — Ча-
рлс, 1909 година. И тој од 'ра-
ти' години стапува на крајски за-
смет и ги сеструа тешикотите на
наричати живот. И тој заболува
од туберкулоза, туберкулоза,
од која што го прати до гробот на
својот живот. И тој честоува
по индикативот движење пред
војата во стапа Југославија и стапу-
ва негов организатор. Стапува член
а Попрорискиот комитет на КП
а Македонија и го подложува
својот живот во борба за: слобода
а македонскиот народ! И војна
ама бугарските фашистички оку-
патори

гу паѓн го осудува на смрт и раси-
штува награда за неговаа глава.
Септем 1942 година тѓи заедно со
Мирче Ацев бива откриен во Велес
и уапсен. И двајцата Мирче и Стра-
шен биваат на страшен начин уби-
ени во полицијата во Скопје, ко-
ри тоа тие ни збор не прозборија
пред своите мачители. Саканија да
и скријат ткините од својот стра-
шен злочин фашистичките завојни-
цикаде не го кажаа телото на Стра-
шо. Денес никој не го знае негови-
от. 1986

Народният херој Страно Пинџур од оние синови на меклокојност и народ за коишто народот од неговото време кажал: „Овај човек е добар, неговата херојска и мажествена смрт не можеше да поверува дека Страно не е повеќе жив. Како легенда се просеа низ Тиквент и во годините од 1942 1943 и 1944 година Страно се јавиа таму или таму, дека тој видел ови или ови, дека жив. Страно заедно со своите другари Мирче Анча Неродот и Ѓорѓиот од Прилеп извучаа загинаа мажествена мажовина на бурната полиција на скопскиот мазор на 21 декември, 1941 година.

Граѓаните на Битола ќе го сочуваат особено во својата памет од ристите времиња на бугарската фашистичка окупација денот кога ве извршило мито беше извршено од некои војвојски истреби. Тоа е денот којшто го носи Битола. Сигурно се расправаше со познати бугарски политичари и началници. Мртвото тело на политичарот заедно со останало мртвото да се на бугарските улици како репрезентатива на сите оние што ја мачеј народот во денот на окупацијата.

Роџдан како посмртне после сепарације својот татко по 1 светска војна. Старио го проведувало своето татко како сираче по многу тешки услови под грижата на својата баба, единствениот негов закрила. Како студент на Београдскиот универзитет факултет за историја, се вклопи во кривото правдоустојанство на движење во Београд и станува член од неговите најдејствителни учесници. Уште во времето на старата Југославија поради својата напредна мисла се трн бие неколку пати за издирени од страна на великојугославјанците, а бидејќи првота револуционери школа велеа што мина Старио.

Ванчо Прже своето основно и сред
но образование го завршува во
Штип кај што беше поснет како
сироче родено 1921 година во се-
ло Сормени во Гевгелиска околина.
Уште како ученик тој бива зафа-
тен во напредната движење.

Поради својата напредна дејност
Ванчо во 1941 година бива приу-
стен да премине во илегален живот
и по тој начин да ја продолжи сво-
јата револуционерна работа. Поли-
цијата трага по него но не може
да го фати. Тој успева дури и да

низанскиот одред "Гоце Делчев".
Под неговото раководство својот одред забележал ниту една изостанетост. Во 1943 година Вагич се враќа во Штип и веќе како селен и опитен војник и политички раководител, Тука ги организира нов партизански одред и како негов командант заедно со своите борци заминава за Македонија. Првпат дојде во Копачкиот партизански Град на 15 ноември 1943. Околу три одредот била откриен и опколен од сите страни. Во неравна борба грчани далеку надмоќноспиритирали, на чело на своите борци Вагич го положи својот живот пред даатот на слободата на Маке-

И пародниот херој, бегсн и командант — Чедо Филиповиќ, беше како и Карпуш бучен и млад, кој на дело на своите борби јуригнаше такувајќи кај што беше најтешко. Само што Карпуш беше ученик а Даме печалбар од Мазаово. Тој беше припадник уште во своето рано детство да го напушти својот крај и отиде ао Белград и како зандари работилник да си наиде прехрана за себе и своето семејство. Но тешиќиот печалбарски живот му си отста-


1941 година кога во неговиот роден крај дојдоа италијанските окупатори следени од чиниите големоробавски слуги. Чеде е раководител на воениот штаб во Мавровско кој тој имаше за задача да го припреми народот за вооружена борба. А потоа при крајот на 1942 година беше формиран мавровскиот партизански одред тој беше на неговото чело. Подоцна Даме стана заменик командант на славната Прва македонско-косовска бригада, а уште поцитоа заменик командант и командант на дивизија.

на овице да Чедо и тој, со помо-
шта на напредното движење во Бел-
град, јасно го согледува патот на
своето и на својот народ ослобо-
дување. Уште пред бојната се вра-
та во својот роден крај решен бес-
рашино да се бори против оние што
угнетуваа неговиот народ.

Загина при несрекен случај во 45 година.

Цаме беше вистински храбар борец и командант и учесник скоро сите најголеми и најпознати борби на Македонија.

Нови производи на Загребачкиот велесајм

[illegible]

Јарбол од бродоградилштето во Краљевица и кула за бушење нафта

Из просторот на велосамот се гледаат поставените на напшта и дусириа, на одделните фабрики и претпријатија. Уште при влезот на самот е поставено големо кубе за дупчење на нафта, што го зела на фабриката "Гуро Гаковски" од Савински Брод. Тоа ги изразува нашите нафтонски подина за кои

комплексните гаритури за вадење на нафта се изработуваат во напшта та земја. Колективот на "Раде Коичар" изработи специјален контролен ик два специјални мотори за вадење на нафта што ги излага на самот. Капелловата турбина веднаш при влезот во велесамот е промовод на "Јужнострој". Оваа моќна тур


била зборува за успехите што ги постигнала "Литострој" пуштајќи во погон турбини од своето производство на новите хидроцентрали што се градат во нашата земја.

Младинаската фабрика „Тиво Леана“ Рибар од Железница минатата година на ова исто место изградил нивни производни. Годината таа изагла уште дава нови производни што сèри се одметнуваат од есента. Сега се од 100 тони се бруствени, а минат од типот РБ/СС-4. Мислу голема радост преживеа работниот колектив на први Јануари 1948 година, кога ја прославуваа својата најголема победа, довршувањето на еден дел од големиот планот, како и тоа што ја прославуваа својата есенска производна. Сега комплетираат својот комплетиран алатни машини се произведоа по свој превенен од Петроградскиот план.

Президенте машини од пошната тежика измислуваат во фабриката "Промаша" големина бројо се зголеми повеќе на одесетот. Година на пак нови претовоно: струјот ТК3/20 и машината за изработка на спирални бурени се зголеми на келноско количество. Тие се гдетодолку повеќе што се изработети од материјали од палин составна изири. Големост кристализатор за нафта, големата ротадиона чешка за капење, машината за памче драго — се нови президенти на фабриката "Братство" исто така изработети од домашни сурувини.

Седумдесет претпријатјаја од Советот за енергетики и екстрактивна индустрија на Власта на ФНР ја доведна излагаа 187 свои претстави од кои 25 се пра наг. Во експертите се изложени примерите на разна руда. Посетителите добиваат јасна претстава за неоскришните богатства на нашата земја, те искористување од дојдана на година станува се' поинтензивно и зема со тоа ја јакне мацата индустрија на тешки машини и алати.

Годешна уште посмислено се истакнува колку се успеале да се осамостојат во преработката на нашите рудни. Рударите од Мексико за **„Светот“** не информираа, нив се са-мостојат за нивоз глумише во при-пад на нивна работна сила, а не-квалитет. Освен самите, од рудна големина, и др. Колективот на бор-скиот рударски теоси добиеното на селен — важира слична во про-ишастото на фотоселен. Првото кое, произведо на катодата во Ма-кедонија, а не во Мексико, а не др-те, од Лестотаци во Србија не-двосмислено зборуваат за напорите што ги припаѓаат рударите за ос-војувањето на новите прехвали. А



Дел од францис-турбина ("Лизюстрес")

Многубројните производи, како ре-
дистрибуираниот ципак — постојат
вод на Црквиштата во Џеџе, цен-
ките од алуминиум што прв пат ги
производи фабриката "Импол"
во Словеска Бистрица, потоа раз-
ните бакари, месинџите и цев-
ките од алуминиум, шипките и дру-
го навистина се гордост на наши-
те работни колективи од екстрак-
тивната индустрија.

На водещият важно място заемат и земеделските машини за нашите селански работни задруги и

за парцелот кај земјоделските на-
става. Имајте на Земај. Членство
от Нови Сад, фабриката за земјо-
делски машини од Марибор, лар-
дот од Осиек, Шумадина од
Белград се др. создаваат свои произ-
води на разни типови земјоделски
машини за селските работни за-
дачи. И што број досега да пр-
вот 1.000.000. Се себичајат на
секој, култиваторот за репка, маши-
ната за сечење и машина за изна-
гање на коприн, ети, потог тра-
кторите од индустријата за мо-
тори. Раковина, што насекој ќе помис-
ли се производи еришци.

Сотте емоционално преживяване от аманата темза инадурига в откритават пред посетителите перспективата за развитието на нашата земя в модна индустриална, изразявава големи преживявания богатства на нашата земя и творческата енергия на нашите граждани, които ще работят с най-модерните технологии за произвеждане на всички машини и компютри днес. Империите и империите преку телематиката в Зетелс оваа година ги удивляват посетителите с нов и творчески инициатива на нашите дружелюбни с кога на нашите граждани се работи за постигане на всички задачи на Империите от плад.



Југословенскиот павиљон на дрвната индустрија

ТЕАТРИТЕ ВО МАКЕДОНИЈА ГОДИНАВА К'Е ИЗВЕДАТ ПРЕКУ 50 ПРЕМИЕРИ

Татарскиот живот во Македонија се појавува на разниа. Покрај тој, маалниот театар во Скопје, кој пред сè е од единствениот театар во Македонија, да не забораваме дека во Скопје уште 11 помали театри. Своиот театар дојеска имаат: Битола, Тетово, Велес, Прилеп, Штип, Струмица, Куманово, Охрид и Гевгелија. Годинава во Скопје е отворен и прв малински театар, со турски и шиптарски ансамбл. Колективно на малинскиот театар веќе ги дате своите први премиери. Покрај тоа во Скопје и Битола работат и градски културни театри. За сега се вршат припреми за отворање на градски театар во Тетово, а наскоро ќе

биде отворен и првот работнички
театар во фудникот Злетово.

Репертоарот на ансамблот на Народниот театар во Скопје, спрема бројот на писаните во новата сезона, ќе биде значително побогат од минатогодишниот. Говатина ќе се изведат илјуби осум преработи на драмскиот репертоар. Драмскиот ансамбл ќе ја изведе сезоната со драмата „Госпоѓа Глембаја“ на Јован Ристовски. Клепаж Оваа пиеса ќе ја режира првокан на Белградскиот народен театар Ранг Павловиќ, додека останатите пиеси ќе ги режираат режисери на Народниот театар од Скопје. Така Илија Милчиќ ќе ја

рејпра пиесата "Длабоки се корените" од Гоу и д'Исо, а Димитар К'старов "Дванаесетата нок" од Шекспир и "Еден месец на селo" од Тургњев. Како петта пиеса, во ова сезона ќе биде изведена една домашна пиеса, со современа тематика, или познатата македонска театарска пиеса "Крвавата македонска свадба" од Чернидриски.

Македонската опера ќе го збогати својот овогodiшен репертоар со три нови премиери: "Кармен" од Би се "Дон Пасквале" од Домијени, и "Аида" од Верди. Покрај тоа ансамблот на операта ќе ги члврти сите десет, досега прикажувани опери.



Ексцентар-преса од 100 тона (Производ на фабриката "Иво
Лола-Рибар")

**За време на моето боравeње
во Македонија имав впечаток дека
живеам во среќно друштво**

Во Скопје беше одржана конференција за печат на која широк британскиот јавен работнички Хенри Н. Њејлсфорд, кој што веќе една месец боран заедно со својата госпожа во нашата земја како гост на Владата на НРМ, — ги изнесе своите заклучоци за нашата земја и за бирбата што нашите народи ја водат за изградба на социјалистичко општество. Преа- претставниците на печатот госпо- дин Хенри Њејлсфорд ја даде след- нава изјава:

[illegible]

На врхо место го поставувам непотростејето на расица ја верока омраза, што го труеше живојот; на тугословните народи. Не само под турско рапоство, туку и под монголските, Срданашето на зешта фелерација врз база на еднакви права претставува победи на политичка мудрост. Јас, кој се секавам на крајните кави што од срдок се по правед бојно бопште, можам ја ја кеан оваа придошката на начин на кој само постарите семераци ја ценат.

Јас се радувам на сигурноста што ја уживам меѓу вас турското и албанското маѓлимото, и се надевам дека ќе можам да видам, федерација на сите балкански народи, по планот како што ја замислува другарот Тито.

[illegible][illegible]

Јас говорев за скоро откриените творечки сили на седините. Ние најдобре, исто така, градителски дух и во градините - на пример во Крушево, каде што е подигањето на прекрасен дом за раб-лиците и уапсена индустрија. Штат беше учесникот кога Народната револуција донесе на власт борбени млади генерации, кои го изградуваат градот во светлот и големи индустријаништво.

Нема нужда да говорим за поезијата на многу докажи на мајри јавни успеси, кои ни чинија со-
лем впечаток — нашата поезија

ствена победа над маларијата; нашата смела градителска борба во Македонија, што во историјата ќе биде упоредена со Динишострој; смирите чекори што ги правиме додека ги ослободите вашите браќа од козите, и да ги подигнете шуми! Видовме што сте направите да ја примените науката во земјоделството.

изјави од Хенри Брејдфорд пред
претставниците
на македонскиот печат

Се срещават со десетки, кои се кривоумат во неидеалната борба со издешно, славно «мъжкото напеление» и призовават да се убави, да се поизмени, да се подобри. Но, за среќа, ние сме в добри позиции. Идните задачи, кога се случат, не са големи, а ние имаме добри навики, динги ќе ги заварим: «сметаме наука». За сѐдого време, но винуаа миста ба проблемите, економични и политични, кои, со кои ние треба да се бориме, поради благодарна на комуниформационските системи. Ние ќе бидеме на состојба да им важиме за своите сопствени наредниции, кога ќе се вратиме во Англича, со каква приност и сега. Идното ние им се призиваваме, да се работи за нив.

«О, први ми дан! Када сам у-
стао, неке бисам пружао и по-
мазао, неке успео сам да из-
вадим која што неважне се одво-
је. То године губитком, обрну-
тих промена, и ја сам се из-
пробавио, туку и на литератур-
ну, музичку и уметничку. Јас ко по-
знавахм Скопје која сега се више
не може да се нађе, а ја сам се
неке. Не можем никако да замис-
лим то ме доводи ка јаму свих дан
ко је чулам прекомерно претпана
и да сам се измислио, а ја сам се
театар, туку може да замис-
лим да је претпана да сам се
само по ваљном главоу трај са
по Вашино Уметничко. На, не
сам се измислио, а ја сам се
и материјално. Фордизам, а ја
сам се. Секот ми је био тако
трај, а Шити наскоро је има хв
и сега ко завршава погледува-
ти, а ја сам се измислио, а ја
сам се, пререкати бис посто-
ница. Не постои по Ангелиа миту
дане град по годишња на Шити,
а ја сам се измислио, а ја сам се
и материјално, а ја сам се

Koga za mrv nat ja vidov vashata zemja jas ne silaveshitso za vashite slaveni umetnicheski gradilini. No, sega, tajnata na fresките vo namti te stari crkvi e otkrivena, Makedonskata umetnost ima vo mnagoto slajni tragi. Predstavuvam deka vashata umetnost vo idnina ke dostigne slajni razmotos

Където заплахата е само и една куца мапона за някои работи, които не трябва да правят. Едно е вашето състояние на доброволна работа, а друго е да ви дават поддръжка, да ви дават нещо, което ви е необходимо, а не да ви дават право да правите каквото си искате. Това е единственото, което ви убива! Не можете да правите каквото си искате, защото сте част от обществото. И това е единственото, което ви убива! Не можете да правите каквото си искате, защото сте част от обществото. И това е единственото, което ви убива!

Ставот на Југословенската за војната во Кореја

(Продолжение от 1-го стр.)

намазете сопствениот стан во Советот
за безбедност. Југословенската де-
милитаризација веднаш во почетокот на
декаријата во Корпиќ Насторожице да
се затворат оперативни да се сосу-
стават обете отпори и да се прона-
де форма за посредување кое би го
спречило продолжувањето на вој-
ната. Иако нејзините проширување. Меѓу
тоа, во тој период успех не беше
достигнат. Сепак, идната таа ФНР
намазете дека надобро му користи на
намазете на мирот иго и понатаму
протрпнување се придружува за таква до
идејателно доседа обемајќи да им
идејателно поддршка на било чин хегемо

Јуџе, који беше донесио закон за
ракоходене за претплатијата на
астрва во работницата. Бесе храбро
го спроведоше оно што заплати-
оните социјалисти одакоа да го на-
праваат, кога дојдоа на власт, но
не сусетише, не го направиле. Џе-
мисон сепак му даде на работни-
ците едно соопштение, едно во
којот јадејашаната митологија, но без
извршена власт. Ње кае ја дејстви-
ејашаната на вашето мисло раково-
деше во жидакото мислеше. Ако тој
успеше, во Југославија, тоа може да
не' охрабри да да бидеме посматри
во Англија.

За време на моето борбено и
Милославски ням изтекло време ка-
же, че е едно претрпело и друго
е едно, че е едно претрпело и друго
до го потпуно управување на
нашиот народност. Истакна, че
нашиот народност не е еднаква
нашиот народност не е еднаква
до го потпуно управување на
нашиот народност. Истакна, че
нашиот народност не е еднаква
нашиот народност не е еднаква

Уште еднаш, не молам да му ја
изпорачите нашата благодарност на
македонскиот народ за неговото брзо
горолство и средно горолство.
Вие там не заборавајте чест што ќе
ја памтите во горолство зборувајќи (м)
живот.

[illegible]

Господица Хенри Брејтсфорд на крајот на конференцијата изнесе дека по разачетото во Велика Британија ќе напише книга во која што ќе ги изнесе своите впечатоци од посетата на земја покрај предавањата што ги мисли да ги одржи преку радиото и по разни градови на Британија, за да придонесе за осветлувањето на вистината за нашата земја*.

истински, тавански во Кореја и
постојувале да се знаде пат кон
општествена и политичка слобода
и независност на корејската војна. Са-
мо по себе се разбира дека влади-
та на ФНР при тоа и постојат да
може да укажува морална и политичка
помош на корејскиот народ во не-
зависната борба за обединување и
истинска демократија. Со вакво
ставање се раководи и напредна деле-
гација на идното заседание на ООН,
којаше да се да придонесе со својата
работа за што побрзо решение
на тоа прашање да се да одржи ми-
рот во светот, како и во интерес
на целиот корејски народ.

*Југословеније се во
право да ја бранат
својата независност*

(Продолжение от 1 стр.)

[illegible]

*) Византия е потретила Климента на мир и правдолюбивостта на миролюбивите кметове на Лодия и дигоса в посетителите на Югославията и самият се състои да ги обичунат-а на Комунистичката партия на Югославията, ватна на пониква дека Югославията може да дозволува на другите сили да ги користе невините миротворци и въздухопловци без да им дава ни овомошва да изграпят явни глупи, дека зашкунатият изследват неговите въздушни сили, а Залпа, или дека се готвят да ги нападне, своите оследи, или дека дека економски комисиони на странни дека се при-

Ново Скопје

(Продолжение от 4 стр.)

јекти со цел да се сочува пивниот
оризенталски стил.

Океј, се консултира неколку дестинации
објекти. Москва, кој што првпат
менструва на некој ентузијазам и со-
здава во римско време, ќе се соопу-
ва „Стара Кула“ единствено место
на којшто се наоѓаат стотици војводи
која во сите време следеле како
бесовски коњи, примања „Св. Димит-
рија“, „Дугу-Пашиното“ асим, по-
дигаат уште во 1484 година црква
на „Св. Спас“, со извонредно богата
иконостас во својот се и својот ме-
стостан атракција „Кален Кула“ ме-
сто во 1508 година, а во 1512 година
Паша, којшто ја создала својата
најголема-Мусафа, Паша 1470 го-
дина и ја презема со освоју. „Чодре-
вички“ ет XIV век „Сили-хан“ ет
тако изградена старина „Бозилек“
— стери, типична хармска црква-
ска зграда и четири мислени умет-
ности, а во 1512 година, кај се
консултира Искр-хаќа ќе бидат со-
зградени и рудниците на аутински
Сопути.

По сите реони ситуирани се шко-
ли а то некаде и детски психи за-
 деца од 3 до 6 години. Сите школи
 се имаат сèки градинашки аони,
 игралишта и потребни поправини
 од воението. Стручни психи ќе
 се изградат во близината на инди-
 стриските центри а школи од сред-
 ствен карактер во близината на бо-
 лее

Под градските бадеми ќе бидат подигањата уметнички школи: баларска, сликарска, драмска, музичка, балетска и фолклорна. На денешниот трг Маршал Тихо ќе се подигнат големи објекти од културно значење.

Операта ќе биде изградена под
самите бодени на градот — Кале
и ќе има посебна стапбест колониа.
По сите реони ќе се изградат
драмски студија а во близината на
фабриката за шитари ќе се изгради
и голема позорница.

Скопје, како што треба да изгледа по генералниот регулационен план невозможно е да се изгради веднаш за неколку години. Негова-

ка во Капитализъм. Делв отанув
фашистичка, дека воспоставув
комиситратииони логори итн. итн.

б) Насекаде каде што такви обвинувања беа доводно прецизни и да овозможат макар какви притоци пазаре, испитувањето на самите места покажа дека се без сончај обични злоупотреби измолциди и ч доволна лага".

Изследването започва със четири двете факти на арсен от военна и полетовете Yugoslavia и СССР. Потърпели са да изследват и да се потвърди, че в Югославия не е възможно да се бранят своите не-защитени, а дека Советският Союз трябва да ги отпрати ованте презгранич на директори на Коммунистическото диктатор по-ра да менне ч-м разпореждане проблеми на директори заедно. Тези две изследвания са свързани. Понякога в Обществения диктатор и несправян с много при-тежителни на Советският Союз на потърпимосте на другите комунистически партии, кои Советският Союз ги поставя на потребата да не-дектатива самостранно, защото ч-м потърпимосте воен-политическа по-потърпимост.

"Ние ја изразуваме нашата црствена убеденост — потпишувачите на овој од изјавата Касч Ротм и Зидијевс — дека понатамошното европентизме меѓу кажите и југословенските наоди а во прв ред поткрепува и разбиратељето на напредното јавно мислење на Запаа на меѓународната политика на Југославија, за којните демократски стремени и социјалистички постигана користи ќе посудува на делото на мирот".

Технички мрежај чије су страни кои што
представуваат милионски известни

цих и неважност е да се означат с имените Тиха или Препета егата ќе биде изопштена индустриската сфаќање на маселата која што паде под поимот "масло". Маселата се користат главно на индустриското сфаќање, поточно на индустриската индустрија со стабилна маселата која што именува секоја од палите, индустриската и стабилна маселата во Голем Пелтон, изопштена на Кисела Вода и Поново Виново, изопштена на Карпош итн. Во доверта егата на изработена на Скопје ќе се изработи и второто дел на индустриската, стабилната маселата кој железничката — стапица "Севен" кај село Бугеа, бизниса кај Голем Пелтон итн.

Веќе до сега, спрема потврдени-
киот план изградба и зголеми пове-
ќе одолго се предвидуваат во на-
шите години кога се пристапи до
изградбата на Скопје. Каде почне-
ва зајде во бидејќи квал на Скоп-
је, ќе види нивни фабрики и ста-
бени населби на местата кај што
некогаш претставувале селските

за драв или обичаен ливач по којшто шешта нирале топка. На место-
то "Пролет" каде само пред не-
годишн немачке циншто, сега во не-
вите станова сменети се идилни по-
бистрици и савршеници со младите
семејства. До фабриката "Минимир"
до Малата станица, во малата По-
ничко, во Кисела Вода, кај спати-
ниот во мидустрискиот парк, тој
Ванчо, којшто сега е во Скопје,

[illegible]

Во Скопје се отвораат нови установи за
предшколско и воншколско воспитување
на децата

Принте школски учебници на македонски јазик излетоа веднаш по сле ослободувањето на нашата татковина. Тоа беа граматика на македонскиот крпиковен јазик, македонски буквар и читанки. За помалите класови отпечатан е обеман зборник на одбрани четива, а за поголемите класови од средине стручните училишта преведени се воглавнo од српско-хрватски и од руски јазик. За неколку предмети учебници на македонски јазик не постоаа. За македонски просвета работништва,

[illegible]

(Продолжение на 6 стр.)

НАШ КОМЕНТАР

Масовен терор над македонското население во Пиринска Македонија

Во текот на август, бугарските мажови со починало со масовно нитер-марше во македонското население во во Пиринска Македонија. Се нитермаршеа без никаква почина, а женов деца, старина, сити да се лена нитермаршеа се преку 500 фа-милијар нитермаршеа во друш-вамајар тајарождица.

Пому треба да нитермарше оваа ха-ка на нитермаршеа македонско нитер-марше во Пиринска Македонија. Се нитермаршеа преку 500 фамилијар да се спроведуваат такви нитермарше мето-ди кајни што беа ретни дури и за времето на кобитурици фаши-сти. Нитермарше нитермарше на нитермарше нитермаршеа преку 500 фамилијар нитермаршеа нитермаршеа се бродоа околу која треба да се замисли секој честит чо-век во светот.

Историята на македонското население од Гиринска Македонија е поволна, од една страна — со својди за денационализација што години под ред го вршеле веднџ бугарската буржоазија, од друга страна, со нејова непрекината борба за очување на својата национална самобитност.

ионална самобитност. Но го доа-
дано го ја отечествено-фрион-
ската власт по Бугарија се сметаат
ска прашањето за националноста
стапило на м-келсонското население
на македонски. Не бидејќи ниту
на дивергент ред, потогото затоа
што сите постојат Народна Републи-
ка: Македонија како слободна др-
жавна на македонскиот народ. По-
жедбите на македонските Македони
и македонските македонски народи
бидат сите национална правна состо-
иона нуста идеја. Затоа сепакта ин-
формационска резолуција го осифири
на поправна она што дотогаш беше
државно сокриено, се појавија не-
македонските македонски народи
и македонски народи. Иако ниту
и македонски народи, а за населението на
и македонска Македонија односно на-
на црна денери.

Ваквата политика на бугарското информбироовско раководство денеска го достигна својот врв. Македонското население од Пиринска Македонија е во опасност и за својот физички обстанок.

[illegible]

Вториот народен заем

(Продолжение од '1 стр)

та и напoлно ја исполнија обврската селаните приредилја веселба на сред селото. Во Дебарска околија сите погранични села спрема Албанија ги исполнија своите обврски а повеќе поединци како Џефат Густина, селанец запишаа по 10.000 или 5.000 денари.

Организацијата ја поддржа својата гледишта преку придонесот од нашата Република — Македонија — со национална и регионална помош. Поведоа натпреварувачки тим со капацитетот на објектот "Земјоделство" од Лалинскиот центар, 500.000 денари, доколку тимот се обвора, натпреварувачите се млади. Гусевиќ завршила еден мисловен денари, задругата од Галинскиот центар, 1.200.000. Во Титов Велец каде што се натпреваруваа како работници кои се одлучиле од преопрејдбата за експлоатација, така и членовите на основните фронтови организации беа запознаени, постои 15.000.000 денари.

Успехот на уписот во вториот нареден заем не е само резултат на патристската свест на Трудбениците. Туку и одраз на нивните економски можности. Животиот станал длабок на Трудбениците во споредба со минатата година значитно е по-длабок, а тоа им даде можност во вториот нареден заем да запишат поголеми суми односно во првиот набавијат на запинувачите, да бидат значитно поголеми.

гаврското раководство и бара сзон
нацистички права.

Со употреба на вакви наредности
настои Черепенков и компанија да
постават да го остават отај што некое
време се мачат да го постигнат
што да им овозможиат саканото по-
простовање на нивната диктаторско-
авторитарска политика. Нивните
пропагандни средства се докожаа
неповољни да ја постават ова за-
дача. Ии фактите што од сиварата
великобугарска друштво в монедков
корупторите слухи од јустиа на Јордан
Анастасов, чия ио кини (дига Гус-
ва) на пример кажуваат "Димитар Гу-
сва" беа остомна пропагандна на Бо-
рисовите фашисти за бугарског кар-
актер на Македонија, кчму што се-
смету ма даваа право да говорат за
"протерестска револуција" и "благо-
творно јување на БКГ" на македо-
нското национално ослободител-
но движење. Затоа не сивојата на
секојдневната непријателска кампа-
ња против ФНПР и посебно против
Народна Република Македонија ка-
ко ии Черепенковите заплушачи, со
"дрената Толага". Наспротив си-
те такви заканувача македонското
народ во Пиринска Македонија за
заканувачите својата обич коп На-
родна Република Македонија се за-
сметувате од нејзините постигања
и не укатување никаква употреба
на непријателската политика што се
поли против неговата слободна др-
жава.

И токму тој факт што не најдоа
на поддршка во македонското насе-
ление ги натера бугарските власто-
држци, по улогот на своите москов-
ски господари кои што исељдија се-
ли националност, да опочнат се-
масовно интернирање од Пјариск.
Македонија, Новиот Сибир о:почна

да се полни со невино македонско население.

Овие мерки, кои што граничат со физичките распределба, покажуваат јасно каква национална поддршка ја спроведува расколотот на БНМ, за "расути" на Пиринска Македонија" за кој што пишува, меѓу другото и "Гародна војна". Овие факти историски покажуваат кому припаднеле фацилните изјави за дилемата за мир кој расколот донесува на денешна Бугарија, односно национално малцинство што живее во граничните области кај држава, додека иако споредени и обединети до нивни членови, нивните биста, биста, биста на неговата земја. И не самостојно, туку "о встанување во прашање, и неговото физичко останок.

Но зимката цел да се обезбуди
Пиринска Македонија нема да се
осветри. Тие и ва овој зимски неми-
да успеаа да го уништат најстото на-
селение од Пиринска Македонија.
Тие само ќе се демаскираат пре-
дметата светска јавност како нај-
социјални предавници на делото
на социјализмот којшто не се со-
зираат ни пред употребата на зар-
варски методи против мирното на-
селение.

За суодната на своите браќа од Пиринска Македонија, дабоко со заинтересирани сите чисти Македонци во оет, Македониј требале да на нашето наследство. Во овој дел од Македонија, крева Г-с на протест кај селот Македонија, а сите тие значајна директна одговорност спот денешното бугарско информбироово раководство, како што со Владо Червенов кое што одовој го подлата нашето население на физичко уништување.

Преку 30 од сто од студентите
на Скопскиот универзитет ќе
примаат стипендии

Од година на година се' повеќе расте бројот на редовните и неовредените студенти на скопските факултети. Факултетите и високите школи во Скопје оваа година ќе примат 515 нови студенти, така што бројот на редовните студенти на Скопските универзитети ќе порасте на 1.800 редовни слушачи. Припремата за редовните предавања на факултетите се извршени и овие денови ќе започнат.

Благодарејќи на големата помош, што им ја укажува на студентите народната власт, голем број студен

ти се материјално обезбедени за студентите. Само Министерството за наука и култура при Владата на НР Македонија годишно додели стипендии на преку 80% од редовните студенти.

Засебно внимание годинана му е просветено и на прашањето на предавачите. Покрај редовите и вонредните професори на Факултетите, годинана се назначени како иставници и околу 20 нови асистенти, кои се одбраќа меѓу најдобрите студенти, што ги завршија годинана своите студии.

Сестран развiток на културниот живот во Битола

Пред 1944-та Битолска имаме зградата на калаша по постоянна театралска група доматине. Зградата на тогва време, вогајдено беше ползувана за давање пиеси од некои дидактичски групи во градот и за јустоване на драмски ансамбли од другите градови. Меѓутоа, нешто повеќе од половина место пратило до последната година на 40 артисти. Во текот на 1948, 1949 и 1950 година ансамблот изведе 365 претстави пред 110.000 лица и направил повеќето турнеи по републиката за кои беа прикажани 42 пиеси.

Покрај градскиот театар, во Битола и отворен и културен театар, била

ски театар, повеќе detски градинци, de-
letna лозарица со 1240 места, mo-
detно kичо "Труденик", постојатo-
не градски цркви, денешно број-
физкултурни и спорски објекти,
зоолошка градина, а неговата Градска
скаја филозофска организација по-
веде акција за изградба на едната
концертна сала со преку 600 места.

Пред војната градот имаше 6
библиотеки со 3.000 книги, денешно
има 65 библиотеки со златно поголе-
ме број книги, а има и 14 читалишта.
То денеска во Битола се општо

сметети 2.400 неписмени, а се предвидува во крајот на годината да се ликвидира напоро на неписменоста во градот. Во Витора има и две културно-уметнички друштва, преку кои се одвива културно-забавниот живот во градот. Тоа се друштвата "Стив Наумов" и "Братство и единство" во кои се зачленети поголем број граѓанини.

**МЛАДИТЕ УЧИТЕЛИ ОД СКОПСКА
ОКОЛИЈА ГО ПРОШИРУВААТ
СВОЕТО СТРУЧНО ЗНАЕЊЕ**

Во 82 училишта во Скопска око-
лија минатата година работела 12
учители.

Појдеме број од учителите се млади Македонци со завршена учителска школа но имајќи годеа, а тој учител од националните малцинства кои немаат доволно стручна спрема. Покрај стручната помош, што ја добиваат од просветните инспектори организирани се 7 синдикални групи, во кои учителите ги пренесуваат стекнатите искуства и ги додизнуваат сите знаења. На состо-

Претпријатието за изградба на далекуводи и трафостаници

**— најдобро претпријатие од
ваков вид во нашава земја**

[illegible]

По стара Југославија, за далеку
вон и трафестаници не може да
стапуна ни збор. Со ескакурва на
неколку правци Македонија бе-
ше во вистински мрак. Петгодиш-
ниот план предвидува во Република
да се изградат 650 километра
далекуници и 16 трафестаници.
Задатка, поставена во Планот, го
делателно на извоформиратото прет-
пријатие за изграба на далекуво-
ди и трафестаници за првми и уште
во права година од Петгодишниот
план, бидејќи сите предпријатии,

а по изата гония се пристави
кой казвателно на столбоните
до далеконилите. Приют дадеку-
ход по нацата република беше по-
пштен во тогорт кои средината на
1948 година. Тоа беше далекуводот
до Герне Петров до рудникот за
хром Радуня. Веднаш беше успе-
ното испунавање на свая зада-
ча, жестовете доби друга азда-
ча — изградба на далеконилите: Кру-
пиче — Кочани, Крупиче — Штип,
и Крупиче — рудник Злетово. До
деломачно изградена, Изграден бе-
ше далекуводот до село Крупичите
до Кочани.

Во 1949 година беа донесени догворите далакевските Крупиште и Штег и Крупиште — рудник Зетско што и беа далаке на употреба на 1 мај — на приизникот на тухот, на 1 мај мавната година беа предводите на употреба и далакевот Скопје Титов Вале. Во изработка на овие далакевски работниште од припреително за далакевско и професионално се збојабја со големи ексуствна, така што те успеаваа своите нрови далакеу да на далакевштинуа, а своите месечни плански задачи да те исполнуваат прех преми. Во текот на годината припреително за далакевски и графостанити те предаде на употреба, уште и далакевците: Тетско — село Врток, Кочани — Зриниш, село Мадари — Кузмино и далакевци, од план за 1949 година работниште колективна на априлградити за далакевски и графостанити те исполни далакеу прех време, така што до крајот на годината тоа те изгра

ли и далекуводот од Титов Веле-
но до Штин, кој е вклопен од армира-
но-бетонски столбови, а започна да
изградува 7 трафостаници. За двете
годины од пландска изградба работ-
ниот колектив од претпријатието
за далекуводи и трафостаници из-
градил 236 километра далекуводи

За оваа година планът на претпријатието беше зголемен. Овогodiшната планска задача на колективот е — 159 километра далекуводи. До месец септември напоили и изградено 91 километар далекуводи. Преостануваат за изградба далекуводите: Битола — централата Ситничка, централата Песочани — Кичево и централата Песочани — Струга.

Десетак радничког колегијума од
она претпријемца има изграђено и
пречесано на употреба 363 кило-
метра даскелових, од којих постоје
укупно дел и на армирано-бетонски
столбови. За испуњавање тих на-
мјена треба да изађу, што и по-
ставља по рамике на Петугодина
из плани, на колективити му преост-
ају да изгради још 220 километ-
ра. Испуњавање на петгодиш-
ната планска задатка и загаранту-
је: радничког колегијума да обав-
ља и да је испуни, бидејш да је
обаврца, која колективити је да-
на са свим начелним дел за него —
на делот која по претпријемце
беше изабран радничког совет. Да
успех со претпријемцега руководи-
лаштво одбор, а преку него во-
димо и да се изврши, да се извр-
ди најважнијате раднички од-
претпријемцега — ударилиште.

новаторите и рационализаторите.

Во текот на минатата шестска година, на околските конференции состаноци на синдикалните групи одржани се предавања на 12 стручни теми и 10 политички, а на состаноците на синдикалните групи одржани се 6 угледни практични предавања.

Англо-Американските власти и му позволили на културно-уметничкото друштво „Тамбурица“ да гостува во Трст

ра, после посета на Југославија по повик на Словенско-хрватскиот сојуз, да гостуваат и во Трст, с цел да даат неколку приредби. Англо-американските власти не можеле да дозволат на целиот колектив да го посети Трст, а го пуштија само раководителот на групата Кајло Бауrowик. Во разговор со напредни интелектуалци за впечатките на членовите на друштвото од Југославија Бауrowик изјави:


"Никогаш нема да ги заборавиме
дејствите проведени во Југославија
откаде понесовме убави позитивни
впечатоци. Секогаш ќе се сеќаваме
со какво олушевување не пречеку-
ваше југословенската публика и
ко не награди за изведбата на пр-
грамите. Турнејата во Југославија
за н'с сити беше школа. Кога ќе
се вратиме во Америка, ќе ја раск-
жуваме вистината за југословенск-
та стварност"

Спорт

Бокс

За прв пат во Македонија се одржува републиканско првенство

Боксот во НР Македонија спаѓа меѓу најмалите спортови. Во стара Југославија боксот беше потполно непознат за македонската спортска јавност. Нашите спортски луѓубители знааа за боксот само од весниците. Меѓутоа, после ослободувањето, заедно со другите спортови, започнаа и боксот.



Момент од бокс-мечот

на нагло да се развила и оваа борба спортска играчка. Како резултат на наглот развој на боксерскиот спорт во 1950 година се пружи можност и услови за организирање на едниот првенство на Републиката. Тоа е првото републиканско боксерско првенство.



Боксерската екипа на "Вардар"

Кошарка

"Работнички" (Скопје) — по штреш патиш првак на Македонија

Во градина, град на НР Македонија — Скопје беа одржани финали на натпреварувања за кошаркарско првенство на Републиката за 1950 година. Во овие натпреварувања учествуваа кошаркарските екипи на "Вардар" и "Работнички" Скопје, "Железничар" од Титов Велес и "Беласица" од Струмица.

По трет пат првенството на Републиката го освои екипата на скопски "Работнички". Таа ја победи екипата на "Вардар" со резултат 53:19 и со тоа покажа дека е најсметна најдобра кошаркарска екипа во нашата Република. Во второто натпреварување "Работнички" го победи "Железничар" од Титов Велес со резултат 47:22. Со овие победи скопски "Работнички" стапа во трет пат првак на Републиката во кошарка.

Неуспех на квалификационите натпреварувања

Набргу после републиканското првенство на првакот на НР Србија, "Единство" со Скопје се одржа турскиот второпласирана екипа на НР Хрватска и "Работнички" — првак на НР Македонија во борба за плување во Сојузната кошаркарска лига. На овој турнир нашиот првак "Работнички" постигна полн неуспех. Тој загуби од првакот на НР Србија со 23:43 и не можеше да се квалификува во Сојузната кошаркарска лига.




Екипата на "Работнички"

АТЛЕТИКА

ЕДЕН ПОРАЗ И ЕДНА ПОБЕДА НА МАКЕДОНСКАТА АТЛЕТИКА



Мидонески



Стар

На 23 и 24 септември во Скопје е одржан традиционален атлетски двомеч помеѓу атлетските репрезентации на Македонија и Босна и Херцеговина (мужки и женски).

После дводневни борби победил машката репрезентација на Македонија со резултат 110:109 бодови и женската репрезентација на Босна и Херцеговина со 74:54,05 бодови.

Во машката конкуренција берме јакни во спринтерските дисциплини каде ги освоише сите први места. Особено тој успех постигна Лазар Мидонески, наш најдобар спринтер, кој е државен репрезентивец на Југославија и учествуваше на атлетското првенство из Европа во Брисел, на меѓународно то среќавање Југославија — Италија во Милано и Југославија — Австрија во Виена. Тој трча на 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600, 3200, 6400, 12800, 25600, 51200, 102400 метри.

На овој атлетски двомеч тој го освои македонскиот рекорд на 100 метри со 11,1 секунди, а 200 метри — со време од 22,5 секунди. Негово најдобро време на оваа па



Ивнева

тека е 22,4 на 400 метри — 1:14,50, а најдобро време му е 49,6 секунди.

Освен него и овој двомеч застапи наши македонски рекорди на 100 метри (својот на 14,0 секунди и фудбалски 39,54 метри). Демир-сали во 10.000 метри со време 34:18,15 минути. Изанова на 800 метри со 2:40,40 метри. Петров во скок со стап 310 сантиметри. Димитровски во клавир со 33,60 метри и други.

Куманово. — Во Куманово го гостуваше одбраната шаховска екипа на Ниш (НР Србија). Во пријателски двомеч во Куманово против првакот на НР Македонија, екипата на град Ниш претрпе пораз со резултат 67:4. Најдобар играч во екипата на нашите првак од Куманово беше прикатегорскиот Тоша Кумиски.

ТУРНИРА НА ОДБРАНИТЕ

Југословенски фудбалери по Скандинавија

Одбраните југословенски фудбалери што ја репрезентираа нашата земја на фудбалско поле заманиа по Скандинавија на турнеја. При својата турнеја југословенските фудбалери одиграа три натпревари и на тоа против Шведска, Финска и Данска.

Победи и олимпискиот првак — Шведска

Меѓународното натпреварување Југославија — Шведска на Стокхолм, по инволутиот на шведските и сите ставски спортисти весници предвидуваа натпреварување на првакот на фудбалско поле на овој две земји. Ова среќавање побези необично жив интерес кај спортистите крвоток во цела Европа. Донесени во голем број спортисти весници од Шведска, Финска, Италија и од други земји заманиа за Стокхолм да ја обавестат својата спортска јавност за ова големо меѓународно фудбалско среќавање.

Четврто место на светското првенство во фудбал и прво место на независното светско првенство — на Олимпијадата 1948, го има во Лондон, — тај беше особено афирмирана во својата и на првенствата на шведскиот фудбал. Баш погледот на југословенските фудбалери беше позитивен, особено затоа што ја репрезентираа својата земја во многу тешко и оловито натпреварување.

Во првото, типично првенство на и борбата игра одбраната фудбалска екипа на Југославија освои заслужена победа над најдобрите европски Шведи и сред Стокхолм со 2:1. Југословенските фудбалери освоија ја позитивна вистоката меѓународна првенство и светска класа на нашиот фудбал.

Репрезентацијата на Југославија ја соопштиа своите игрици: Милутиновиќ, Хорват, Ставровиќ, Чајковски.

Издава: Заруженето на журдела сите на НР Македонија — Скопје

ски, Јовановиќ, Газиќ, Огњанов, Митиќ, Вазов, Бобек, Херцег. Годишните за репрезентацијата на Југославија ги дадоа Вазов и Херцег.

Неочекуван пораз

На второто меѓународно среќавање Југославија — Финска одигра во Хелсинки, за голема жал на нашоа, беше победени. Победени од непрофесионална земја по фудбалот — Финска. Овој пенален пораз е екипното поразе за нас, дека противникот не смеа да се потнегува, дека на секое натпреварување фудбалерите треба да дадат се од себе за победа. Финска не победи со резултат 3:2. Иако нашите фудбалери го потврдиле противникот се спела и од тоа што уште во првото полувреме нашата репрезентација доведе со 2:0. Меѓутоа, финските фудбалери со голем елан и одлученост за зафатија во игра

екипата против репрезентацијата и потврдиле југословенскиот фудбалер. И заслужено победила.

Експедиција против Данска 4:1

Трето натпреварување во Скандинавија, југословенската репрезентација го одигра во Копенхаген против репрезентацијата на Данска. Почетокот од доплото искуство во Хелсинки, југословенските фудбалери далеку се поправиле и на натпреварувањето против Данска никакојаш не покажаа емоционална игра, каква што во Копенхаген ретко се видела. Тоа е уште еден доказ за високата меѓународна зрелост на југословенскиот фудбал. Оваа моќа и бела над Данска ја употребуваа играчите и победа над репрезентацијата на Шведска.

После овие три натпреварувања југословенските фудбалери се вратија со две победи и еден пораз.

Тениско првенство на Македонија

И тенис како и боксот во Македонија нема традиција. Првенствата на Републиката се одржувале овдеша после ослободувањето на нашата земја. За тенисот во нашата Република се жале многу малку. Тој е познат само во поголемите градови. После ослободувањето тој започна да се шири и кај нас. Одржани се веќе две републикански тениски првенства.

Пол Јорданов — македонски тениски првак

Последното тениско првенство на Македонија за 1950 година го освои македонскиот тенисер Пол Јорданов. Најинтересно на тениското првенство беше финалниот борба за првото место помеѓу македонските тенисери Пол Јорданов и Чакар. Пол Јорданов успеа да го по-

беди талантливите тенисер Чакар во два сета 6:2; 6:2 и со тоа да го заземе првото место во Републиката. Ова е најголем досегашен успех на Пол Јорданов на тениското поле. Неговиот успех е логички позначаен што Пол Јорданов не беше знаен тенисер кај нас. Неговото име никој до тогаш не го чул во спортскиот живот.

Во финалната борба за првенство во дуба се бориа двојките Пол Јорданов, Јанески против Јанески, Тодоров, многу интересна и жива борба победи двојката Јанески — Тодоров и со тоа го освои првенството на Републиката.

Тенисерите што учествуваа на републиканското првенство се членови на спорските друштва "Студент" и "Мидонески" од Скопје.